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NOTES
PROVIDER-SPECIFIC QUALITY-OF-CARE DATA: A
PROPOSAL FOR LIMITED MANDATORY
DISCLOSURE
INTRODUCTION
Both judges and legal scholars have recog-
nized that patient autonomy in medical decision making is
an important interest which is legally protected by means
of the tort doctrine of informed consent.1 Medical care
I The concept of autonomous decision making has been expressed by the philoso-
plier John Stuart Mill ("Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LmEr 6 (Liberal Arts Press 1956), and by Judge
Cardozo ("Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine
what shall be done with his own body;, and a surgeon who performs an operation without
his patient's consent, commits an assault...."). See also Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y.
Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129-30, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914).
Patient autonomy has not yet been recognized by courts as a distinct and indepen-
dent legally protected interest. If so recognized, the invasion of this interest would re-
quire compensation regardless of whether any actual bodily injury occurred. Instead, pa-
tient autonomy is protected indirectly through the protection of two other interests:
bodily security and bodily well-being.
Bodily security is protected by rules against non-consensual contact, i.e. the doctrine
of battery. Bodily well-being is protected by rules of professional competence, i.e. mal-
practice determined by the doctrine of informed consent. Both interests require actual
bodily harm for compensation. Some legal scholars have argued that patient autonomy
should be a distinct interest since both the battery and informed consent doctrines have
gaps and flaws that leave the patient autonomy interest unprotected. See Marjorie
Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest,
95 YALE L.J. 219 (1985); see also Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Low's
Vision, 39 U. Prrr. L. Rxv. 137 (1977). But see Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, In-
formed Decision-Making and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation,
1988 U. IL. L REv. 607, 620-21 (without the consequential damages of a failed medical
procedure, the value of a patient's autonomy interest is quite small).
The physician-patient relationship generally arises by contract. See Gray v. Grun-
nagle, 223 A.2d 663, 674 (Pa. 1966) ("IThe agreement between the physician and his
patient is contractual in nature .. "). However, owing to a patient's inability to bargain
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providers2 are under an affirmative legal duty to provide suffi-
cient information required by a patient to make an intelligent
informed decision whether to undergo treatment or choose an
alternative treatment.3
Until recently, providers could provide patients with infor-
mation regarding only the general risk data associated with a
particular treatment.4 But recent developments in computer
databases and communication technology have permitted the
with the provider over quality of care, a provider's performance has traditionally been
governed by the tort law doctrine of battery in the area of informed consent malpractice.
Battery is defined as an intentional tort consisting of the unpermitted touching of
one person by another person. A physician is liable for battery when the physician has
performed treatment without consent (not including the exception of emergency), or per-
forms a treatment different from the one assented to, or exceeds the limits of the consent
given. See generally W. PAGE KEETON Er AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 9, at 39-42 (battery), § 18, at 112-21 (consent and the emergency privilege) (5th ed.
1984).
A physician may be liable for medical malpractice (a special form of negligence)
when he or she has failed to use reasonable care in the diagnosis or treatment of the
patient's illness. See generally KEETON Er AL., supra, § 32, at 185-89.
Finally, under the doctrine of informed consent a physician may be held liable for
damages to a consenting patient if he or she failed to disclose adequately the course of
treatment, the collateral or inherent risks of the treatment, and, in some jurisdictions,
alternative treatments. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra, § 18, at 120-21, § 32, at 189-
93. For a history of the informed consent doctrine, see Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and
Informed Consent in Medical Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy,
47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 379, 388-96 (1990).
To be held liable under the doctrine of informed consent for non-disclosure of infor-
mation, the patient must prove the four elements of negligence: (1) that a duty to dis-
close the undisclosed information existed; (2) that nondisclosure constituted a breach of
that duty (which depends on whether duty to disclose is defined by a profes-
sional-reasonable physician standard-or by a materiality-reasonable pa-
tient-standard; (3) that the nondisclosure of risk information caused damage (i.e. full
disclosure would have altered the decision to consent to treatment); and (4) that actual,
recognizable bodily damage resulted. See Hunter L. Prillaman, A Physician's Duty to
Inform of Newly Developed Therapy, 6 J. CONTSmp. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 43, 43-46 (1990).
2 Medical care providers can include hospitals, physicians, chiropractors, podiatrists,
hospices, and outpatient surgical centers. This Note will limit its scope to hospitals and
physicians. The analysis for hospitals is analogous to other health care facilities; the
analysis for physicians is analogous to other medical professionals.
3 For a discussion of the disclosure of alternative or newly developed treatment, see
Bruce C. Recher, Note, Informed Consent Liability, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 696, 710-11
(1977); Prillaman, supra note 1, at 46-52.
" General risk data often include the possible risks that can occur with the proce-
dure or its alternatives and the "odds" of any risk occurring. For example, one hospital's
anesthesia consent form presents a number of such odds: mild disturbances of cardiac
rhythm, 1:100; serious disturbance of cardiac rhythm, 1:200; myocardial infarct, 1:2000;
and cardiac arrest, 1:5000. Jones, supra note 1, at 401.
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rapid and large-scale collection of medical records from hospitals
and physicians. 5 The records are then analyzed to generate pro-
vider-specific quality-of-care data.6 Provider-specific quality-of-
care data are, in essence, statistics on the success (or failure)
rate for a specific procedure or diagnosis, or an overall compila-
tion of procedures of a specific hospital or physician. If made
5 A number of articles review the legal implications of computerized medical record
keeping. See generally Brian Kibble-Smith & Arthur W. Hafner, The Effect of the In-
formation Age on Physicians' Professional Liability, 36 DEPAuL L. RE%. 69 (1986); John
J. Fargo, Comment, Medical Data Privacy: Automated Interference with Contractual
Relations, 25 BuFF. L. REv. 491 (1976); Adele A. Waller et al., Automated Medical
Records: Legal Questions and Risks, 10 CoUspTEs ni HELTHCArE 27 (1989).
' The collection and analysis of patient records to measure provider quality is
known as "outcome analysis," of which comparative physician and hospital ratings are
just two forms of output. These data answer the provider's question: "How well am I
doing?" The new era of computerized collection and analysis of patient risk data linked
to diagnoses and procedures also gives rise to patient-specific risk information. Instead of
general "odds" computed over a large population, a patient can be given "odds" tailored
to his or her characteristics-age, race, gender, weight, physical condition, presence of
co-morbidities and other risk factors. These data answer the patient's question: "What
are my chances?" as opposed to "What are the average patient's chances?" Dr. Gerald
T. O'Connor (epidemiologist of Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center in Hanover, N.H.
and lead author of a New England study of death rates among heart bypass patients),
Presentation at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium on Comparing Medical Providers
(Jan. 9, 1992) (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
Another form of "outcome analysis" output measures the appropriateness of a given
treatment to determine whether a particular procedure or diagnosis is overutilized or
unnecessary. See, e.g. Constance M. Winslow et aL, The Appropriateness of Performing
Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, 260 JAMA 505 (1988) (the study found that 56% of
bypass surgeries were appropriate, 30% equivocal and 14% inappropriate); Constance M.
Winslow et al., The Appropriateness of Carotid Endarterectomy, 318 NEw EO G. J. MED.
721 (1988) (a study on this controversial treatment (the surgical removal of the inner
layer of the carotid artery, when thickened and degenerated by fatty deposits, used to
reduce the risk of stroke) showed 32% of surgeries were inappropriate and concluded
that the procedure was substantially overused, and, even when appropriate, the risks
clearly outweighed the benefits); Michael S. Zdeb & Vito Mt Logrillo, Cesarean Child-
birth in New York State: Trends and Directions, 16 BmrH 4 (1989) (a study on the
possible overutilization and misuse of cesarean sections by New York State obstetri-
cians); C. Everett Koop, M.D.: A Time for Change [hereinafter PBS's "A Time for
Change'] (PBS television" broadcast, MacNeil/Lehrer Production, 1991) (Former Sur-
geon General of the United States commented that perhaps 30% of all procedures and
diagnostic treatments such as coronary artery bypass grafting, hysterectomies, and lower
back surgery are unnecessary and cost Americans approximately q50 billion a year.).
This Note will not examine the disclosure of patient-specific risk information or ap-
propriateness data.
An example of such data would be cardiac artery bypass grafting (CABG) surgery
mortality rates for either hospitals or physicians. This Note will use the term hospital-
specific to indicate information that is solely linked to hospitals. Similarly, the term phy-
sician-specific will denote information that is linked to physicians only. Provider-specific
1992]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
available to the patient, this information should increase patient
autonomy and may permit the patient to make a more informed
decision concerning not only the course of treatment, but also
the selection of health care providers.
The first significant public disclosure of provider-specific
data was made by the Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA").s HCFA published rankings of hospitals based on
overall and procedure-specific mortality rates of Medicare pa-
tients.' More recently, New York State's Department of Health
released rankings of New York hospitals and physicians 0 based
on risk-adjusted, open heart surgery-related mortality rates.11
will be used to specify information linked to either or both hospitals and physicians.
a HCFA is the federal agency that oversees the Medicare program and statewide
Peer Review Organizations under the United States Department of Health and Human
Services. See infra note 18.
" See Myron D. Fottler et al., Public Release of Hospital Specific Death Rates:
Guidelines for Health Care Executives, 32 Hosp. & HEALTH SERVICES ADMIN, 343 (1987).
1" Risk-adjusted rankings of New York hospitals were publicly released in Decem-
ber, 1990. At the same time, similar rankings of New York heart surgeons were released
to hospitals but not to the general public. Upon a freedom of information request by
Newsday, a New York newspaper, the New York State Department of Health released
the physician rankings to the newspaper, but with the physicians' names deleted. See
David Zinman, Rating Healers of the Heart: The State Ranks Surgeons' Mortality
Rates on Coronary Bypass Operations, but Limits Access to the Public, NEWSDAY, Mar.
12, 1991, at 51 [hereinafter Healers of the Heart]. Newsday successfully challenged the
Health Department's decision to withhold the physicians' names in New York State Su-
preme Court after some unsuccessful administrative appeals. Newsday, Inc. v. New York
State Dep't of Health, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1477 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1991); see
also notes 24, 162. The state Health Department thereafter complied with the court's
disclosure order. Newsday then published a list of 140 rated New York heart surgeons.
See David Zinman, Heart Surgeons Rated: State Reveals Patient-Mortality Records,
NEWSDAY, Dec. 18, 1991, at 3 [hereinafter Heart Surgeons Rated].
11 Risk-adjusted mortality rates are death rates that have been adjusted to account
for the patient's severity of illness and other factors prior to undergoing surgery. Theo-
retically this allows all providers performing this surgery to be compared on an equal
basis since the patient's pre-treatment conditions have been factored out of the death
rate. Thus providers who operate on sicker or older patients, who naturally have a higher
death rate, are not penalized in the statistics. For a more detailed explanation of how
risk-adjusted statistics are computed, see infra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Ta-
bles 1-3 in the attached Appendix provide examples of these statistics. For other samples
of the released rankings, see Janice H. Tanne, The Best Hospitals in New York, NEW
YORK, Nov. 18, 1991, at 38-39 (ranking of 14 New York City hospitals by their 1990 risk-
adjusted mortality rates and the distribution of risk-adjusted mortality rates as a func-
tion of number of cardiac artery bypass operations performed); Heart Surgeons Rated,
supra note 10, at 34 (risk-adjusted mortality rates of 140 New York heart surgeons and
their hospital affiliation listed in order of number of cardiac artery bypass operations
performed); David Zinman, Heart Bypass Deaths Worry State: North Shore Faces In-
vestigation, NEWSDAY, June 7, 1991, at 7 [hereinafter Heart Bypass] (ranking of 30 New
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These disclosures were widely publicized, highly controversial
and vigorously contested by providers. 2
Proponents of public disclosure1 3 contend that the public
has a right to know this information since such information will
encourage patients to make more informed decisions about
which hospitals and physicians" to select for treatment. These
data may show that a provider delivers poor care or lacks experi-
ence in treating a specific ailment. Such information takes on
added significance when a person must select a primary care
physician or hospital under a managed care program, ' when a
York State hospitals by risk-adjusted mortality rate for cardiac artery bypass surgery).
12 See supra note 11; see also, Let People Know How Their Heart Doctor Ranks,
NEWSDAY, Oct. 24, 1991, at 60 (in support of the New York State Supreme Court decision
mandating release of physician-specific data) (editorial); Shirley E. Perlman, Surgeon
Rankings Go Public, NEWSDAY, Oct. 22, 1991, at 6 (describing the battle to have New
York State physician-specific data released); Lawrence K. Altman, Unraveling the Mys-
tery of Bypass Survival, N.Y. "ImEs, Aug. 20, 1991, at C3 (new studies challenge the
prevailing view that differences in death rates can be explained by simple risk factors);
Brian McCormick, HCFA Refining Hospital Mortality Data, 34 Ams MEn. NEws 1 (1991)
(by refining its data, HCFA implies that previous data may have been flawed); Harold S.
Luft et al., Does Quality Influence Choice of Hospital?, 263 JAMA 2899, 2909 (1990)
("[Health outcome] data might be almost impossible for a layperson to use effectively..
."); Joyce A. Lanning & Stephen J. O'Connor, The Health Care Quality Quagmire: Some
Signposts, 35 Hosp. & HEALTH SERviCEs AD! m 39 (1990) (criticizing HCFA's attempt to
provide consumers with a provider performance "scorecard" since its punitive approach
is more likely to result in greater defensive medicine and not better health outcomes);
David Zinman, Study Faults NCMC, Again Critics Say Feds' Death Rate Study is
What's Faulty, NEWSDAY, Dec. 16, 1988, at 7 [hereinafter Study Faults NCMC; Gale
Scott, Death Study Blasts 8 Hospitals but Federal Statistics Challenged, NEWSDAV,
Dec. 16, 1988, at 7; Fottler, supra note 9, at 349-51 (describing potential problems With
the release of hospital-specific data); Sidney Wolfe, M.D., Public Watchdog Wolfe Un-
leashes on Providers, 61 HosprrALs 62 (1987) [hereinafter Public Watchdog Wolfe] (Sid-
ney Wolfe, M.D., head of Public Citizen Health Research Group, rebuts providers' criti-
cism of HCFA's release of mortality data).
13 Various consumer advocate groups have fought to have provider-specific quality-
of-care data publicly disclosed, including Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Health Research
Group, Center for Medical Consumers, the New York Public Interest Research Group,
the State Committee on Open Government and the American Association of Retired
Persons.
"' As one article noted: "Savvy medical consumers realize that when they pick a
primary physician (an internist, a family practitioner, a gynecologist or a pediatrician),
they are also picking a hospital. And so they give strong weight to the quality of the
institution with which the prospective doctor is affiliated." Tanne, supra note 11, at 38.
11 Managed care is
used to describe health insurance plans designed to cut costs by monitoring the
access to, quality and frequency of medical care. Insurance companies have
designed these plans especially to oversee the use of high-priced specialists,
technologies and hospital stays. In order to get reimbursed, patients must go to
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person new to a community needs a doctor, or when a person
requires a specialist. That person may lack other information on
which to base a decision. These data also can be used by general
practitioners when referring patients to specialists and
hospitals.'
Consumer advocates also suggest that public disclosure will
increase state inspectors' scrutiny of low-quality providers. 17
This additional pressure will force hospitals and Peer Review
Organizations' s to improve their self-monitoring of physicians
networks of doctors and hospitals willing to accept lower fees and stiffer regu-
lations on their practices in exchange for guaranteed payment and high
volumes of patients.
Dena Bunis et al., Our Health, Whose Costs? The Question of Who Will Pay For Health
Care has Hit Home, NEWSDAY, Dec. 1, 1991, at 4. Approximately 49 million American
workers, 38% of the workforce, are enrolled in managed care programs: either health
maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, or point of service plans.
Id. A primary care physician is a doctor chosen by a plan member, or designated by the
plan manager, to be the first physician that member contacts for any medical problem.
This physician acts as the patient's regular physician and as a "gatekeeper" who deter-
mines if the patient needs to see a specialist or requires hospitalization. Id. See also
infra notes 180-81, 192 and accompanying text.
16 See infra note 182.
7 See, e.g., Heart Bypass, supra note 11, at 7. In 1991 three hospitals had heart
bypass death rates high enough to prompt in-depth state inspections: University Hospi-
tal (Downstate) in Brooklyn, North Shore University Hospital in Manhasset and Strong
Memorial Hospital in Rochester. This data also may refocus state inspectors from hospi-
tals they thought were problematic, but which the data showed to be acceptable. See
Scott, supra note 12, at 7.
"' Federal law requires the Department of Health and Human Services to enter into
contracts with Peer Review Organizations (PROs). See Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi-
bility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, §§ 141-150, 96 Stat. 324, 381-95 [hereinafter
TEFRA] (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c to 1320c-12 (1991)). PROs replace the
Professional Standards Review Organizations ("PSRO") that were created as a 1972
amendment to the Social Security Act. Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 249F(b), 92 Stat. 1548,
1671-89 (1972) (repealed by TEFRA). The intent of Congress in enacting PSRO and
PRO legislation was to insure that services were medically necessary and provided on an
outpatient basis if possible, and that inpatient stays were minimized. These aims were
consistent with reducing health care costs. See Peter M. Mellette, The Changing Focus
of Peer Review Under Medicare, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 315, 327-28, 337-39 (1986).
Composed primarily of health care practitioners from within a geographical area,
PROs perform quality assurance and utilization reviews of health care providers seeking
reimbursement for their services through the Medicare program. Physicians who partici-
pate in PROs validate the accuracy of diagnoses, review the appropriateness of admis-
sion, and examine the quality of care provided to a patient by other physicians when a
claim for reimbursement is submitted. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-2, 1320c-3 (1991).
The Health Care Quality Improvement Act of 1986 ("HCQIA") granted PRO partic-
ipating physicians qualified immunity from liability to enhance a PRO's ability to iden-
tify incompetent or unprofessional physicians. HCQIA also attempted to shield partici-
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and hospital procedures.' 9 For example, public disclosure of hos-
pital rankings by New York State has already led to a substan-
tial improvement in hospital performance.20
Some supporters propose that providing hospital and physi-
cian quality-of-care data to the public may increase the competi-
tiveness of the health care market.2' Competition may further
pating physicians from federal antitrust liability. HCQIA was passed because of the
failure of PROs to identify and remove incompetent physicians adequately. Even if in-
competent physicians were identified, they often plea bargained; in exchange for the hos-
pital's silence, physicians agreed to surrender their licenses. The physician would then
set up a new practice in a neighboring state. See Susan L. Homer, The Health Care
Quality Improvement Act of 1986: Its History, Provisions, Applications and Implica-
tions, 16 Am J.L. & MED. 455, 461-64 (1990). To forestall this, HCQIA made available a
national practitioner data bank for medical malpractice payments and adverse actions so
that incompetent physicians could be tracked across state boundaries. 42 US.C. §§
11101-52 (1992).
However, PROs still may fail to protect the public from incompetent physicians due
to weaknesses in HCQIA, including potentially inadequate confidentiality provisions,
conditional discovery of documents undermining confidentiality and retaliatory measures
against participating physicians despite immunity. See Homer, supra, at 481-95. State
licensing boards that work in conjunction with PROs, have also been ineffective in re-
moving incompetent and possibly dangerous physicians from medical practice. See Susan
Schmidt, Panel Has Difficulty Determining Incompetence, WAsH. Post, Jan. 11, 1988, at
Al; Susan Schmidt, Doctors Rarely Lose Licenses: Maryland Panel Allowed Rapist to
Keep Practicing, WAsH. PosT, Jan. 10, 1988, at Al. In light of these failures, release of
physician-specific data to both hospitals and physicians has been suggested as a means
of identifying incompetent or unprofessional practitioners. Barry R. Furrow, The Chang-
ing Role of the Law in Promoting Quality in Health Care: From Sanctioning Outlaws to
Managing Outcomes, 26 Hous. L Rv. 147, 164-66 (1989).
"' See Public Watchdog Wolfe, supra note 12 (pressure on hospitals after first pub-
lic release of mortality data by HCFA caused hospitals to examine closely the compe-
tency of the doctors on their staff); Fottler, supra note 9, at 351 (suggesting proactive
strategies for managing the disclosure of hospital-specific data, one of which is "remedy-
ing clinical deficiencies").
20 A striking example was the dramatic improvement of St. Vincent's hospital in
New York City. See Tanne, supra note 11, at 38 (hospital ranking indicates a reduction
of risk-adjusted mortality rate from 7.34% to 0.88% during probation). St. Vincent's was
one of three New York Hospitals placed under probation in the late 1980 after data
indicated inferior care. PBS's "A Time for Change," supra note 6; Heart Bypass, supra
note 11, at 7. In 1991, St. Vincent's topped New York State's ranking of hospitals as a
result of improved hospital procedures. While under state scrutiny, St. Vincent's hospital
improved its performance by "referring out difficult cases for six months, carefully treat-
ing unstable patients before surgery, and closely monitoring their post-operative phase to
reduce complications." Id.
21 See Robert G. Hughes & Douglas E. Lee, Public Information on Private Prac-
tices: The Availability of Physician Inpatient Data, 35 HosP. & HRnTr Snavicas AD-
LuN. 55 (1990); Thomas L. Greaney, Competitive Reform in Health Care: The Vulnera-
ble Revolution, 5 YAL.E J. ON REG. 179, 205 (1988); Division Has No Plan to Attack
Health Care Information Service, 50 AN'rrRusT AND TRADE REG. Rzp. (BNA), No. 1271,
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increase if the quality-of-care data is coupled with pricing infor-
mation.2 Increased competition among providers might, in turn,
reduce health care costs and increase the quality-of-care. 3
On the other side, providers bitterly oppose public disclos-
ure of provider-specific data. 4 They argue that the data are too
1154 (1986) [hereinafter No Plan to Attack] (Discussing Lexecon Health Service, Inc., a
privately held Illinois corporation that planned to collect and analyze provider-specific
data, Assistant Attorney General Douglas H. Ginsburg commented, "[t]he availability of
provider-specific and quality information should facilitate more informed health care
purchasing decisions and thereby produce increased competition among providers".). See
also Group May Gather, Disseminate Data, Dentists Can Conduct Survey, Letters Say,
12 Pens. Rep. (BNA), No. 37, 1271 (1985) [hereinafter Disseminate Data] (describing an
Ohio nonprofit health care organization that collected and disseminated provider-specific
health care information to encourage "pro-competitive" informed decision making about
the purchase and design of health care benefit plans).
22 Coupling price information with quality information allows health care purchasers
to compare value and thus increase competition. Pamela Taulbee, Outcomes Manage-
ment: Buying Value and Cutting Costs, Bus. AND HEALTH, Vol. 9, Issue 3, at 28 (1991)
[hereinafter Outcomes Management]
At the root of any purchasing decision is the concept of cost. Achieving a bal-
ance between quality and cost is always a challenge for purchasers .... In the
health care system ... each provider must secure its individual market share
by offering quality and [cost] efficient delivery to its customers-both patients
and purchasers .... In the old market of few providers and minimal competi-
tion, most providers could be confident of their survival. In the new market, no
such assurances exist.
John D. Butler, GM's View on Purchasing High-Quality Providers, 61 HOSPITALS 90, 90
(1987). See generally Ann M. Purr, Insurers Fight for Cost Containment, 84 BEST'S RE-
VIEW LIFE-HEALTH INS. EDITION 42 (1984) (collection and analysis of provider-specific,
procedure-specific cost data to monitor overpayment or excessive hospital stay duration,
excessive testing or visits); Susan Adelnan, Why Business and Medicine Need to Work
Together, 34 AM. MED. NEWS 19 (1991) (discussing use of provider-specific cost and qual-
ity-of-care data to self-regulate both costs and quality); Maria R. Traska, Managed Care:
Whoever Has the Data Wins the Game, 62 HOSPITALS 50 (1988) (discussing an em-
ployer's requirement for provision of provider-specific data by its insurer to evaluate
provider practices).
13 See generally Hughes & Lee, supra note 21; Greaney, supra note 21, at 205; J.
Michael Wooley & H.E. Frech, III, How Hospitals Compete: A Review of the Literature,
2 U. FLA. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 57 (1988-89); James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan, Redefin-
ing Government's Role in Health Care: Is a Dose of Competition What the Doctor
Should Order?, 34 VAND. L. REV. 849 (1981).
2' Hospitals, physicians, and organizations representing them have opposed data
disclosure in the press and medical journals. See, e.g., Heart Bypass, supra note 11, at 7
("Cardiac surgeons bitterly oppose making public the risk-adjusted ratings .... 'It's not
statistically valid,' said Dr. Frank C. Spencer ... 'It's a fraud.' "); Scott, supra note 12,
at 7 ("[S]tudy gives a 'false impression' that the [cited] hospitals are giving substandard
care. 'We must strongly question the findings.' "); Fottler, supra note 9, at 351 ("[T]he
release of hospital specific death rates ... to consumer groups ... may be potentially
disastrous.").
Data disclosure has also been opposed in courts. See Newsday, Inc. v. New York
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complex for the patient to understand and that patients will ei-
ther ignore the data or draw erroneous and detrimental conclu-
sions from the data.25 At best, providers maintain, the informa-
tion would be only marginally useful in patient decision
making. 26
Physicians vehemently contend that current methods of
analysis do not properly distinguish between poor quality care
and the severity of the patient's illness or other risk factors.27
Inaccurate data or rankings may harm the reputation of a high-
quality provider, possibly leading to substantial financial loss,
Sate Department of Health, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1477, (Sup. CL Albany County
1991); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Department of Health, Education and
Welfare, 477 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
" See e.g., Newsday, 19 Media L. Rep. at 1477 (1991) (New York State Health De-
partment refused to disclose physicians' names with physician rankings because such
data would be "misunderstood" and "misused" and of "little public benefit."); Luft,
supra note 12, at 2909; Study Faults NCMC, supra note 12. "'It is inconceivable ...
how HCFA can knowingly publish a report with such flawed methodology, recognizing
that the public has and will continue to draw totally unfounded negative conclusions
concerning the quality of care provided by hospitals', said Dr. Tracy Strevey, executive
director of Nassau County Medical Center, the only hospital on Long Island whose mor-
tality rate was higher than its expected average." Id.
2' See Hughes & Lee, supra note 21 ("The assumption that making health care in-
formation available to consumers will alter their behavior is not well supported by re-
search" (citing a study performed by Karen Glanz & Joel Rudd, et aL, The Quality of
Medical Care: Information for Consumers, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assess-
ment (1988)).
Accuracy of data has been attacked in numerous publications. See Altman, supra
note 12 (discussing surgeons attempts to figure out why mortality rates from heart by-
pass operations varied as much as 400% in a New England study); Bypass Death Rates
Differ By Hospital, NEwsDAY, Aug. 20, 1991, at 77 (discussing inconclusive studies of
widely varying mortality rates among heart bypass patients in both New England and
Philadelphia).
HCFA has indicated that it is refining the mortality rate statistics to include death
rates for patients who die within 90 days of admission and 180 days of admission in
addition to death rates for patients who die within 30 days of admission so that longer
course illnesses can be better accounted for. This implies that previous statistics failed to
account for longer term illnesses adequately. But, opening the time window may also
allow for other risk factors to enter the statistics, allowing for even more uncertainty.
McCormick, supra note 12. See also Healers of the Heart, supra note 10, at 51 (surgeons
note that the weighing of the risk factors is flawed, tilted against doctors with the high-
est-risk patients); Heart Bypass, supra note 11, at 7 (surgeons charge that ratings penal-
ize hospitals that take the sickest patients and that the state may have ignored some risk
factors); Fottler, supra note 9, at 349-50 (hospital spokesperson noted that elderly peo-
ple, typical of Medicare patients, may have several life-threatening problems (comorbidi-
ties such as high blood pressure, diabetes, and kidney disease) that are unaccounted for
in the HCFA risk model and can lead to a higher than expected death rate).
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hospital closure, or a ruined career.
Disclosure of provider-specific data by government agencies
may also have far-ranging legal ramifications. The rank ordering
of hospital and physician success rates may change the nature of
informed consent and medical malpractice litigation. Failure of a
provider to disclose this information to a patient may indicate a
breach of informed consent disclosure requirements, 8 unless
government dissemination is deemed to satisfy them.2" Evidence
that a provider performs procedures in a way that the statistics
indicate are too risky may be, if admissible, 30 evidence of negli-
gence in a medical malpractice action. 1 Conversely, defending
physicians may assert new forms of contributory negligence or
assumption of risk defenses based on data revealed to a patient,
e.g., if the patient is aware that the physician is ill-suited to per-
form a specific treatment and yet elects to be treated by that
physician.32 The introduction of provider-specific quality-of-care
data as evidence of negligence may also create an atmosphere for
punitive damages, which are generally rare in malpractice
lawsuits.3
Disclosure may also give rise to some undesirable social and
economic consequences. Public disclosure will certainly affect,
for better and worse, the sensitive physician-patient relation-
ship. 4 There may be an increase in defensive medicine by prov-
iders, taking the form of an increased reluctance by providers to
treat high-risk patients. 5 There may be a reduction of marginal
providers in communities that can ill afford to lose any medical
services, even if the quality of those services is lower than aver-
age. 6 Inexperienced interns and residents, who are more likely
to have lower rankings, may leave the profession or change their
28 See infra notes 256-64 and accompanying text.
29 Id.
20 See infra note 166. See also Paul D. Rheingold, The Admissibility of Evidence in
Malpractice Cases: The Performance Records of Practitioners, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 76
(1992).
31 See infra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
2 See infra note 269 and accompanying text.
33 See infra note 271.
34 See infra notes 272-76 and accompanying text. See also Jesse Green, Problems in
the Use of Outcome Statistics to Compare Health Care Providers, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 55
(1992).
22 See infra notes 277-87 and accompanying text.
30 See infra Part III.D.3.C.
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specialty to one that is not ranked.
Part I of this Note will examine the current state of pro-
vider-specific quality-of-care data. Part II of this Note will ex-
plore the current laws governing the dissemination of the data.
Part HI-A of this Note will weigh the benefits and costs of
mandatory data disclosure and Part HI-B will suggest some limi-
tations on disclosure to maximize those benefits and minimize
those costs. Part III-C will then determine the extent that cur-
rent regulation protects the interests of both patients and prov-
iders. Upon finding current laws inadequate, Part llI-D of this
Note will propose regulations that mandate limited public dis-
closure of provider-specific quality-of-care data collected and
analyzed by all federal and state-agencies and their contractors;
this Part will also examine some of the legal and nonlegal side-
effects of the proposed regulations. This Note concludes that the
proposal of mandatory disclosure by government collecting agen-
cies would increase the patient's autonomy interest inherent in
informed consent, increase the quality of health care and poten-
tially decrease provider costs. Moreover, limited disclosure
Would minimize potential harm to providers and diminish some
of the undesirable legal and nonlegal side effects of full
disclosure.
I. THE CURRENT STATE OF PROVIDER-SPECIFIC QUALITY-OF-CARE
DATA
A. Who Collects and Analyzes Input Data
Medical record information is currently collected and ana-
lyzed by federal and state government agencies, their contrac-
tors and private organizations. Federal and state governments
originally became involved in the collection, analysis and dis-
semination of provider cost and outcome data to stem the rising
costs of health care.38 Now data collection is also viewed as a
37 Id.
"The accelerating cost of medical care is the driving force fueling the outcomes
movement. Health-care expenses are expected to rise to $313 billion this year, a record
14 percent of the nation's gross national product. It was 4 percent in the 19503. The
increase, which is expected to continue at 12 to 13 percent for the next five years, is
forcing buyers to look carefully before they choose where to spend their health dollars."
David Zinman, Gauging the Quality of Health Care, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 1992, at 51, 54;
see supra notes 22-23.
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means of measuring and controlling the quality of health care.39
While the primary focus of government data systems is collect-
ing hospital-specific data,40 the focus is beginning to shift to-
wards collecting and disclosing physician-specific data.41
Two federal agencies are involved in the collection of qual-
ity-of-care data. The Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA"), under the direction of the United States Department
of Health and Human Services ("HHS") that oversees the Medi-
care program, has the largest collection of health care data.42
HCFA maintains the Medical Statistical System for the collec-
tion and analysis of data.43 In addition, some non-Medicare data
are collected by the National Center for Health Statistics
("NCHS").44 NCHS obtains data from state vital statistics col-
lection systems, hospitals or private collection systems.45
Additionally, thirty-two states have some form of hospital
data collection systems.46 Peer Review Organizations ("PROs"),
statewide organizations under contract to HCFA, independently
collect and generate provider-specific data for utilization review
39 "[Outcomes management] consists of a common patient-understood language of
health outcomes; a national data base containing information and analysis on clinical,
financial, and health outcomes that estimates as best we can the relation between medi-
cal interventions and health outcomes, as well as the relation between between health
outcomes and money, and an opportunity for each decision-maker to have access to the
analyses that are relevant to the choices they must make." Furrow, supra note 18, at
171-72 (quoting Ellwood, Shattuck Lecture-Outcomes Management: A Technology of
Patient Experience, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1549, 1551 (1988)); Lanning & O'Connor,
supra note 12, at 40-47. The author views outcome measures as a "comparability sign-
post" on the "road travelled" in rating providers for effectiveness and efficiency. The
author also considers the patients' perceptions of the effectiveness, i.e. patient satisfac-
tion, as an equally important outcome measure. This, however, is more difficult to quan-
tify than individual or aggregate outcome measures such as mortality or morbidity.
Hospitals are the primary target of data collection because they are relatively few
in number and represent the largest proportion of health care expenditures. Hospitals
represent 40% of health care expenditures, approximately twice that of physicians. See
Hughes & Lee, supra note 21.
"' See Edward L. Hannan et al., Adult Open Heart Surgery in New York State: An
Analysis of Risk Factors and Hospital Mortality Rates, 264 JAMA 2768 (1990) [herein-
after Open Heart Surgery]; Hughes & Lee, supra note 21; see Heart Surgeons Rated,
supra note 11, at 3.
42 James B. Simpson, Release of Physician-Specific Quality of Care Information:
Legal Issues, U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment 6 (1988).
43 Id.
41 Id. at 14.
45 Id.
4' See infra note 150.
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and quality control.47 Some private organizations, such as Medi-
care fiscal intermediaries and carriers, may collect data under
HHS or state agency contracts.48 Other private organizations,
such as private health insurers, hospitals or businesses, also col-
lect health data or purchase publicly available data previously
collected by federal or state agencies and analyze the data
themselves. 9
B. Types of Input Data
Data collected by the preceding organizations are usually
submitted by hospitals on standardized hospital discharge data
forms.50 These forms contain sections for both cost and treat-
ment data.51 Data may also be collected directly from hospital
records or hospital computer systems.52 The amount and types
of data collected depend upon the purpose of the collecting or-
ganization. Organizations collecting for the purpose of cost and
quality control through market competition, so as to provide
maximum information to consumers, generally require more
data with greater detail than those that seek to control cost and
quality through regulation."3 Also, organizations that focus their
analysis on only one or a few specific procedures usually request
additional procedure-specific risk factor information to improve
the accuracy of their analyses."
Physician identification information is required by HCFA
47 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
" Simpson, supra note 42, at 21.
49 No Plan to Attack, supra note 21, at 1154; Disseminate Data, supra note 21, at
1272.
"o HCFA uses the Uniform Hospital Billing Form, form UB.82/HCFA 1450 or 1500
(UB-82). Data collecting states use either the Uniform Hospital Billing Form, the Uni-
form Hospital Discharge Data Set (UHDDS), or state forms incorporating elements from
the UB-82 or UHDDS. See Hughes & Lee, supra note 21.
11 Data on these forms usually contain a patient identifier (name or Social Security
number), patient's date of birth, age, sex, diagnosis related group or principal and sec-
ondary diagnoses, principal and secondary procedures, length of stay, discharge status,
patient's ZIP code, hospital charges and hospital identifier.
52 Hughes & Lee, supra note 21.
53 Id.
" For example, Pennsylvania desires to collect "provider quality and provider ser-
vice effectiveness elements." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 449.1 et seq. (1991). However,
these elements have not been defined. New York State's Cardiac Surgery Reporting Sys-
tem collects detailed clinical risk factor information. See Open Heart Surgery, supra
note 41.
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and by twenty-five of the thirty-two states that collect data."
Some states also require that consulting or assisting physician
identifiers be submitted .5  The physician identifier links the
physician's name to the treatment or diagnosis, making the
ranking of physicians based on their successful performance of a
given treatment or diagnosis possible. However, some states
keep the physician's identity secret by encrypting the physician
identifier.5 7
C. Input Data Analysis and Output Statistics
The analysis of the collected input data creates various
types of output statistics. Statistics are generated for specific
procedures 8 or on an aggregate basis.59 Various types of quality-
of-care statistics may be generated; the most common is mortal-
ity (death) rate. 0 For each quality-of-care statistical type, a
number of statistics may be generated. The most common of
these include the "crude" rate, 1 the "expected" rate 62 and the
"risk-adjusted" rate. 3 From these rates, secondary statistics
may be computed, such as "outliers." '
The crude or actual rate is computed directly from the raw
Physician identifiers may be: the physician's name, a statewide number, a medical
license number, Social Security number, or a hospital-unique number. See Hughes &
Lee, supra note 21.
56 Id.
Encryption is the process of scrambling the identifier code in a predefined man-
ner, or replacing each numeral/letter in the identifier code with a different predefined
numeral/letter. The net result is that the actual identity is unknown to those who do not
have the decryption key. With an encrypted identifier it is still possible to analyze physi-
cian practice patterns either across the state, if a statewide identifier has been encrypted,
or only a single hospital, if a hospital-unique identifier has been encrypted. Id.
58 For example, statistics have been computed for the following procedures: coro-
nary bypass artery graft, resection of abdominal aortic aneurysm, partial gastrectomies,
colectomies, total cholecystectomy. Edward L. Hannan et al., Investigation of the Rela-
tionship Between Volume and Mortality for Surgical Procedures Performed in New
York State Hospitals, 262 JAMA 503 (1989). To a lesser extent, statistics have been
generated on diagnoses, such as acute myocardial infarction.
" Aggregate statistics are computed by averaging all the statistics of individual pro-
cedures for a given hospital or physician.
60 Other types of statistics may be generated: morbidity rates, reinfection rates, re-
admission rates, and transfer rates. All are indicative, to a greater or lesser extent, of
quality of care.
01 See infra note 65 and accompanying text.
"2 See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
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input data.6 5 For example, the crude death rate is computed by
dividing the number of deaths by the number of cases. Thus,
one death in one hundred cases would generate a crude rate of
one percent. However, the use of these crude rates by them-
selves is problematic because they do not properly account for
the severity of the patient's illness. Thus, providers who treat
the sickest patients will be penalized by having naturally poor
crude rates when compared to providers who treat relatively
healthier patients.
The expected rate is computed using a form of multiple re-
gression analysis.6 6 The expected rate predicts a quality-of-care
15 In this Note, "raw" input data are data collected directly from the providers, i.e.
data that has not yet been statistically analyzed. To compute the crude rate, divide the
number of incidents (deaths, reinfections, readmissions, etc.) by the total number of
cases for a given provider and a given procedure. See Open Heart Surgery, supra note
41.
Multiple regression analysis is a statistical technique for mathematically estimat-
ing relationships between two or more variables, for example, the relationship between
deaths subsequent to coronary heart bypass surgery (the dependent variable) and age,
weight, sex, hypertension, severity of illness, presence of comorbiditie, etc. (explanatory
factors). One must determine if a causal relationship exists between the dependent varia-
ble and the explanatory factor, and if so, to what degree. For example, do older patients
tend to die more often than younger patients, and if so, by how much? Also, to what
degree does the person's age contribute to the overall chance of dying? Once all the
relationships between the explanatory factors and dependent variables are knowm, one
may then predict the dependent variable from a given set of explanatory factors.
In a linear multiple regression model, the dependent variable is portrayed as a
weighted sum of explanatory factors plus a random error term. These weights are called
regression coefficients. These coefficients establish how much importance one should give
to each explanatory factor. A large positive coefficient implies that small increases in the
explanatory factor correlates to large increases in the dependent variable if all other fac-
tors are held to constant values; a large negative coefficient implies the inverse relation-
ship. A coefficient at or near zero implies that changes in the explanatory variable do not
affect or weakly affect the dependent variable. In some contexts the quantities of interest
are the weighing coefficients, Le. how well does the regression equation "analyze" or
model the relationship between the dependent variable and the explanatory factors. In
other cases, the expected or predicted value off the dependent variable for a given set of
explanatory factors is the quantity of interest. See McHAn 0. Fi uLamsN & BRUCE
LEvw, STATIsmcs FOR LAwYERs 323-29 (1990).
Once it is established that the underlying modeling of the dependent variable, for
example, the mortality rate, is statistically valid, the quantity of interest is the predic-
tion of the dependent variable, for example expected mortality rate, and the accuracy of
that prediction. Two of the criticisms launched at the data by hospitals and physicians
go to the validity of the underlying modeh significant risk (explanatory) factors are miss-
ing from the regression equation and the regressions coefficients computed are them.
selves inaccurate. Thus any predicted quantity from a flawed equation will be flawed
itself.
For a more detailed understanding of the type of regression analyses actually used in
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indicator, again for example, the death rate, given the presence
of certain risk factors that correlate to the severity of the pa-
tients' illnesses before treatment. By accounting for these risk
factors, providers are given credit for treating "sicker" pa-
tients. 7 This now puts the providers on a level playing field.
HCFA's multiple regression formula uses Medicare inpatient
mortality rates as the dependent variable and various demo-
graphic a and diagnostic-related group ("DRG") risk factors" as
the explanatory factors. New York State's unique Cardiac Sur-
gery Reporting System ("CSRS") uses a number of complex
clinical risk factors 70 in addition to demographic and DRG ex-
planatory factors in an attempt to estimate the expected mortal-
ity rate more accurately.
As an example of how expected rates allow for an estimate
of a provider's performance, let's say a provider (Provider A) has
computing quality of care statistics (the regression models are more advanced and multi-
ple steps are performed to achieve accurate models for each explanatory factor-depen-
dent variable relationship), see Edward L. Hannan et al., Coronary Artery Bypass Sur-
gery: The Relationship Between Inhospital Mortality Rate and Surgical Volume After
Controlling for Clinical Risk Factors, 29 MED. CARE 1094 (1991) [hereinafter Coronary
Artery Bypass Surgery].
17 A patient's pre-treatment severity of illness, i.e. how "sick" a patient is prior to
having the operation performed, only partially accounts for the patient-related risk.
Other explanatory factors account for the remainder of the risk-age, gender, weight,
race, etc. See supra note 66 and infra notes 68-69. But for the purpose of this Note, the
term "sick" will refer to not only the patient's severity of illness, but also the contribu-
tion of these other risk factors.
08 See Fottler et al., supra note 9, at 346-47 (demographic information generally
includes age, gender, ethnic background, and socioeconomic status).
89 Diagnostic-related groups (DRGs) "comprise a means by which patients are
grouped into homogeneous categories with respect to specific diagnostic, therapeutic, and
demographic criteria in order that the costs appropriate for substantially similar patients
be relatively uniform." Greaney, supra note 21, at 190 n.69. DRGs arose out of the pro-
spective payment system under which the Medicare program pays hospitals fixed, pro-
spectively-determined prices based on the patient's diagnosis. There are 470 DRGs
within which a patient can be placed. Id.
70 Clinical risk factors used in the New York State study on in-hospital death fol-
lowing coronary artery bypass surgery include: number of reoperations, ejection fraction
(how much blood is being pumped out of heart), previous myocardial infarction ("heart
attack") in last 7 days, morbid obesity, hypertension history, preoperative intra-aortic
balloon pump, dialysis dependent, disasters (acute structural disaster, renal failure, cari-
ogenic shock, gunshot wound), unstable angina, congestive heart failure, diabetes, greater
than 90% narrowing of the left main trunk, "crash," valve operation, other operation.
Demographic characteristics included age, race, gender, and socioeconomic status deter-
mined via the payer (Medicaid versus non-Medicaid). Not all factors were deemed to be
significantly related to the dependent variable of in-hospital mortality. Open Heart Sur-
gery, supra note 41, at 2769-72.
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a expected mortality rate of 2%. Provider A should have lost
only two patients in 100 cases composed of patients having a
certain mix of pre-treatment risk factors. If Provider A's crude
mortality rate was 1%, then Provider A is performing better
than expected. A second provider (Provider B) may have an ex-
pected mortality rate of 10% because of treating sicker patients,
i.e. a different and more severe mix of pre-treatment risk factors.
Thus, if Provider B had a crude mortality rate of 5%, then Pro-
vider B is also performing better than expected. On the other
hand, if a third provider (Provider C) had an expected mortality
rate of 2% (that was estimated from a different mix of pre-
treatment risk factors than Provider A's but was equally severe)
and a crude mortality rate of 5%, then Provider C is performing
worse than expected. Although expected rates permit an assess-
ment of provider performance, they do not facilitate easy
comparison.
To allow for easy comparison among providers having dif-
fering crude and expected rates, and also to provide comparison
of all providers to the group average, the statistics are "risk-ad-
justed" so that all providers have a patient mix facing identical
pre-treatment risk factors, i.e. all patients are made statistically
equally sick. Thus any difference in the risk-adjusted rates can
be assumed to result largely from the quality of care given by
the provider to the patients.7' The risk-adjusted rate is com-
puted by dividing the crude rate by the expected rate and then
multiplying this ratio by the average crude rate.72 Assuming the
quality-of-care statistic is indicative of poor care, e.g. mortality
rate or reinfection rate, the lower the risk-adjusted rate the bet-
ter the provider's performance. Providers then can be ranked
easily in order of their risk-adjusted rates.
Using the previous example and assuming an average crude
mortality rate of 5% computed over 50 providers, Provider A's
risk-adjusted mortality rate is 2.5% (1.0% crude rate divided by
2.0% expected rate times 5% average crude mortality rate), Pro-
vider B's is 2.5% (5%/10% times 5%), and Provider C's is
12.5% (5%/2% times 5%). Thus, Provider A and Provider B
would have an identical risk-adjusted rate, that is, ranking, even
though five times more patients have died under Provider B's
71 Id.
Coronary Artery Bypass Surgery, supra note 66.
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care. Since Provider B's patients were five times more risky to
treat than Provider A's patients, Provider A and Provider B are
statistically equivalent in performance. Provider C, however, is
performing five times worse than either Provider A or Provider
B. Why? When compared to Provider A, both providers had the
same expected mortality rate, but Provider C lost five times
more patients. When compared to Provider B, even though both
providers lost the same percentage of patients, Provider C's pa-
tients were five times less risky to treat. Also, Provider A and
Provider B performed better than average since 2.5% is less
than 5%, the group average, and Provider C performed worse
than average since 12.5% is greater than 5%.
Risk-adjusted rates allow for the easy comparison among
providers but do not identify "outliers," i.e. those providers who
performed statistically much worse or better than what was pre-
dicted for them. To determine whether a provider is an outlier
one compares a provider's crude rate to the statistical lower and
upper bounds for that provider's expected rate. 3 If a crude rate
11 The upper and lower bounds, the difference of which forms the confidence inter-
val, reflect the accuracy of the regression analysis used to compute the expected rate, i.e.
how well does the regression analysis actually predict. Because of errors in the analysis
process, as well as errors in the raw input data, the expected rate will be faulty. See
supra note 66.
This error in the expected rate may be modeled as a randomly distributed variable.
In general, a random variable is a quantity that is defined for each member of a popula-
tion and is such that the probability of observing any value of the variable can be known
(at least in theory). FINKELSTEIN & LEVIN, supra note 66, at 23-24. A well known distri-
bution is the normal, "bell-shaped distribution." Id. at 24-25. For the purpose of this
Note, it will be assumed that the error in the expected rate can be modeled by the nor-
mal distribution; however, the actual shape of the distribution will depend on the distri-
bution of the input and analysis errors. (This assumption may be nonetheless correct by
the Central Limit theorem, which states that the joint probability of N number of ran-
dom distributions will become normally distributed as N increases. Since the number of
inputs and regression equations are fairly high, the total number of error contributions
may be high, thus causing the expected rate error to take the shape of a normal
distribution.)
Only two parameters are needed to fully characterize a normal distribution: mean
and standard deviation. The (arithmetic) mean is the average of all values. If the regres-
sion analysis is unbiased (which will be assumed), then the mean of the error of the
expected rate is zero. If the regression analysis always predicted a value higher or lower
than it should have predicted, then the analysis would be biased, i.e. a non-zero mean
error. But even when this occurs, the prediction can be corrected by adding or sub-
tracting this value to the estimated expected rate, bringing the mean error back to zero.
The more important quantity is the standard deviation; it determines the dispersion
of the distribution around the mean. The accuracy of the regression analysis, assuming
zero mean error, is determined by the standard deviation alone. The more standard devi-
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"lies outside" of these bounds, then that provider is deemed an
outlier. If the crude rate lies below the lower bound, then that
provider performed significantly better than what was expected;
conversely, if the crude rate lies above the upper bound, then
that provider performed significantly worse. Note that one can
be near the top of the rankings but still be a high (significantly
worse) outlier if a provider's performance is much better than
the other providers' performances but far worse than what it
should have been; the converse can also occur.7 4 Consequently, it
is useful to use both the outlier status and risk-adjusted rate to
assess a provider's performance.
Using the previous example, assume Provider A's expected
rate of 2% was bounded by 0.5% and 3.5% for a 95% confidence
interval." Furthermore, assume Provider B's expected rate of
10% was bounded by 6% and 14% for the same 95% confidence
interval. Provider A's 1% crude rate is within its two bounds of
0.5% and 3.5%, and therefore is not an outlier. But Provider B's
5% crude rate is below its lower bound of 6%. Thus Provider B
is a low outlier, performing "significantly" better than what was
expected. Since Providers A and B had equal risk-adjusted
rates, one may use B's good outlier status as a selection criterion
ations a value is from the mean, the less probable that value will actually occur. For a
normal distribution, the mean has a 0.4 probability (40% chance) of actually occurring; a
value two standard deviations from the mean has approximately a 0.06 (6% chance)
probability of occurring. The sum of probabilities over all values is 1.0. In fact, the
probability of all values greater than two positive standard deviations from the mean
and less than two negative standard deviations from the mean is approximately a 0.05, or
5%, chance of occurring. Thus, a value between two standard deviations below and
above the mean has a 95% chance of occurring, ie. 95% accurate. That interval of plus
and minus two standard deviations is called the 95% confidence interval.
For example, let's say the expected rate was estimated to be 5% with a standard
deviation of 1%. By definition of the normal distribution, that expected rate computa-
tion will be 68% accurate within the confidence interval of 4-6%, with 4% (5% - 1%) the
lower bound, and 6% (5% + 1%) the upper bound. This interval is called the 63%
confidence interval. The computation will be 95% accurate within the confidence inter-
val of plus/minus two standard deviations, or 3% to 7%. To find out how upper and
lower bounds were computed using provider-specific data, see Coronary Artery Bypass
Surgery, supra note 66, at 1101.
I In general, however, low outliers will usually also be near the top of the risk-
adjusted rate rankings and the high outliers will be near the bottom. Thus outliers may
only provide a small amount of additional information to that gained by the risk-ad-
justed rate rankings alone. For example, in New York's 1989 hospital study, risk-ad-
justed rates for low outlier hospitals range from 1.31% to 2.56%, whereas the range is
from 6.38% to 9.84% for high outlier hospitals. Id.
75 For an explanation of 95% confidence interval, see supra note 73.
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to choose between A and B.
The presentation of the statistics is also an important issue
if the data are to be disclosed to, and used by, the public. The
misrepresentation of data could lead to misuse of data by con-
sumers or could unjustly enrich or harm providers." Currently,
data are usually presented in rank order, with the provider with
the lowest (best) risk-adjusted statistic topping the list.11 The
crude and expected statistics may also be included in separate
columns. Some raw input data also may be presented, for exam-
ple, the number of deaths and the volume of cases. The outliers
may be denoted by one or two symbols to indicate whether they
performed significantly better or worse than expected.78 See Ap-
pendix Tables 1, 2 and 3 for examples of data presentation."
71 For a description of general risk data presentation and its potential pitfalls, see
Twerski & Cohen, supra note 1, at 627-39.
7 See infra note 79 and accompanying text. See also Tanne, supra note 11, at 38.
7" See infra note 79 and accompanying text. See also Tanne, supra note 11, at 39.
7' See Appendix Tables 1, 2 and 3. Table 1 provides, for each hospital performing
open heart surgery in New York State from January 1989 through June 1989, the num-
ber of cardiac surgical patients, the crude mortality rate, the expected mortality rate
based on the logistic regression model, and upper and lower bounds for the expected
mortality rate. Hospitals are ranked in order of increasing crude mortality rate. Outliers
are identified by single (significantly worse) and double (significantly better) daggers.
Open Heart Surgery, supra note 41, at 2772. Table 2 is the New York State Department
of Health presentation of the same data presented in Table 1. Note that the risk-ad-
justed rates have been presented instead of the expected rates to make comparison eas-
ier. The hospitals also have been ranked in order of increasing risk-adjusted mortality
rate and not the crude mortality rate. Finally note that outlier information has not been
included in 'the 1989 data. State of New York Department of Health, Cardiac Surgery in
New York State, D.O.H. NEws, Dec. 4, 1990 [hereinafter Cardiac Surgery]. Table 3 is the
latest presentation of data by the New York State Department of Health. The hospitals
are listed by alphabetical order instead of being ranked by risk-adjusted rates to make
comparing hospitals more difficult. Also note that the crude mortality rate information is
no longer presented. Finally, note that outlier information is now presented. State of
New York Department of Health, Heart Surgery, D.O.H. NEws, June 6, 1991 [hereinafter
Heart Surgery].
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I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Current Laws Governing Disclosure of Provider-Specific
Quality-of-Care Data
1. Federal Law
a. Federal Agencies and Private Organizations under
Contract to Federal Agencies
The largest provider-specific quality-of-care database is
generated by the Health Care Financing Administration
("HCFA"),80 an agency under the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS"). 1 HCFA collects data under the So-
cial Security Act for its Medicare program. 2 Disclosure of HI-S
information is generally prohibited, except as the Secretary of
HHS prescribes by regulations, or as otherwise provided by fed-
eral law. 3
Disclosure of data collected by a federal agency, such as
HCFA, is also governed by the Freedom of Information Act
("FOIA")8 and the Privacy Act.8 H-S has adopted regulations
to handle the Medicare data disclosure requirements of these
federal laws.8 The general policy of these regulations is to allow
the "fullest responsible disclosure consistent with those require-
ments of administrative necessity and confidentiality which are
80 See Fottler, supra note 9, at 342-56.
81 Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1306(a) (1991).
Id.
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1977). The Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA") is a sweeping
mandate to disclose upon request government agency information to the public. It was
passed by Congress in 1966 to control executive secrecy. Unless the records subject to the
request fall within one of the statute's narrow exemptions, disclosure may not be prolb-
ited. The exemptions from mandatory disclosure are discretionary; thus information that
falls within an exemption may still be released if the agency so elects. However, if the
government agency objects to disclosure, it bears the burden of proving that its with-
holding of the requested records falls within one of the nine enumerated exemptions.
5 U.S.C. § 552a (1977). The Privacy Act prohibits the disclosure of any kind of
retrievable information about an individual in the government's files. 5 U.S.C. §
552a(a)(5). It does, however, provide that an agency may disclose such information with-
out obtaining the individual's consent if disclosure would be required under FOLA. 5
U.S.C. § 552a(b)(2). The net effect of these provisions is to permit disclosure where
FOIA requires it, but to prohibit disclosure where FOIA allows the agency to refuse to
disclose.
88 42 C.F.R. §§ 401.101-152 (1986).
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recognized in the Freedom of Information Act. '87 Under these
regulations, HCFA permits disclosure of official reports8 about
hospitals, state agencies, intermediaries and carriers under
Medicare, 9 but disclosure of official reports about physicians is
expressly prohibited. 0
HCFA permits disclosure of Medicare information to state
and federal agencies 1 as well as the disclosure of some Medicare
information to the public.9 2 HCFA has maintained and disclosed
public-use hospital-specific data files since the 1980s. Upon re-
quest, Medicare Provider Analysis and Review ("MEDPAR")
data, Quality of Care ("QC") MEDPAR data, Medicare hospital
mortality rate data and other data files relating to cost and
demographics are available for public use.9 3 However, Medicare
data that explicitly identify physicians are not publicly
available.94
An important legal issue is whether disclosure of physician-
specific quality-of-care Medicare data can be demanded by pro-
spective patients or consumer advocates under FOIA.95 HHS
policy recognizes "the right of public access to information," bal-
anced by "the legitimate interests of ... persons who have sub-
mitted records to the Department." 8 The tension in this policy
is reflected in the applicability of both the Privacy Act and
FOIA to physician-specific data. The Privacy Act applies only to
records that are about individuals, as long as the records are in a
system of records;9 7 FOIA favors disclosure and applies to all
HHS records.
87 45 C.F.R. § 5.2 (1986). See also 45 C.F.R. §§ 5.1 et seq. (1986) (describing pur-
pose, policy and scope of HHS disclosure).
88 Official reports include statements of deficiencies, survey reports, follow-up re-
views, provider performance evaluations and contractor performance evaluations. 42
C.F.R. § 401.133.
8I Id.
8o 42 U.S.C. § 1306(d)(3).
81 42 C.F.R. § 401.134.
82 42 C.F.R. § 401.135.
82 Janis Nero, HCFA's Public-Use Files: A Wealth of Data, 63 HOSPITALS 72 (1989).
8, 42 C.F.R. § 401.133(b).
88 Before HCFA will release public-use files, it must conceal the patients' identities.
The patients' identities-name or Social Security Number-can be masked by computer
database techniques. HCFA may release these files without disclosing the patients' iden-
tities. This Note will not discuss issues concerning disclosure of a patient's identity.
88 45 C.F.R. § 5.2.
45 C.F.R. § 5.4(a).
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Physician-specific data extracted from Medicare reports
meet both the "individual" and "system of records" require-
ments of the Privacy Act,"" thus subjecting this information to
the Privacy Act.99 Records governed by the Privacy Act may be
disclosed whether requested by or with the prior written consent
of the physician, 100 or without the physician's consent only if the
disclosure falls within one of the Privacy Act's exceptions.01
The most likely exception would be the one requiring informa-
tion to be disclosed under the FOIA.
The FOIA, on the other hand, provides for mandatory dis-
closure of federal agency records upon request, 0 2 unless the
records fall into one of several enumerated FOIA exemptions.1
0 3
Several exemptions may apply to physician-specific quality-of-
care data. For example, exemption 6 exempts "personnel and
medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.""'
Exemption 4 covers "commercial or financial information, ob-
tained from a person, [that is] privileged or confidential."105
FOIA also exempts matters "specifically exempted from disclos-
ure by statute" under exemption 3.106
Traditionally, exemption 6 has been used to protect the pri-
93 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(a)(2), (a)(5).
99 Id.
1*0 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
101 Disclosure is permitted without the individual's consent for use within the
agency, FOIA compliance, routine use, law enforcement, compelling circumstances and
by court order. Id.
102 5 U.S.C. § 552(a).
103 FOIA does not apply to nine exempted matters:
(1) national security information,
(2) internal agency personnel rules and practices,
(3) matters specifically exempted by statute,
(4) trade secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a per-
son and confidential,
(5) interagency memoranda,
(6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy,
(7) law enforcement records,
(8) financial regulatory agency records,
(9) geological well data.
5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)(1)-(9).
104 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6).
lOB 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3).
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vacy interest of patients.107 But exemption 6 has also been used
to prevent the disclosure of provider-specific data.108 There are
three requirements necessary for this exemption: (1) the infor-
mation must be contained in a medical file; (2) disclosure must
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy;
and (3) the severity of the invasion of personal privacy must
outweigh the public's interest in disclosure. 09
Physician-specific quality-of-care data might fall within the
exemption's first requirement since the data are generated
through the analysis of raw data gathered from medical files.
But the data need not be explicitly contained within a medical
file. It is only necessary that the privacy interests that arise from
physician-specific information are similar to those that arise
from medical files." 0
Next, a court must determine whether disclosure would con-
stitute a "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."'
A court would probably find that the physician resisting disclos-
ure would have a genuine privacy interest."2 But the "clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" language has been in-
terpreted to reflect a congressional policy in favor of disclos-
ure." 3 Thus, to prevent disclosure, the physician's privacy inter-
" Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Dept. of Health, 477 F. Supp. 595, 603
(D.D.C. 1979) ("Protecting the intimate details of an individual's medical file is indeed a
central goal of the privacy exemption [6].").
108 Id.
'09 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 166-67 (D.D.C. 1976).
1o Harbolt v. Department of State, 616 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 856 (1980).
212 Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 471 F. Supp. 1023,
1026 (D.D.C. 1979).
112 Public Citizen, 477 F. Supp. at 603. The Public Citizen court found that a genu-
ine privacy interest was "implicated under FOIA" since the disclosure of physicians'
identities in medical service reviews "raises the prospect of misleading publicity, possibly
unwarranted professional and public criticism, and damage to professional reputation."
Id. The information sought to be disclosed was arguably personal in nature about indi-
vidual physicians and could lead to professional embarrassment; it would reveal that "a
physician had performed a large number of surgical procedures," or had "requests for
extension in hospital denied regularly." Id.
13 Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 378 n.16 (1976). See also
Hrones v. CIA, 685 F.2d 13, 19 (1st Cir. 1982) ("the balance favors disclosure"); Ditlow v.
Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1975) ("In addition to the Act's general presumption
of disclosure, the 'clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' language expresses 'a
carefully considered congressional policy favoring disclosure' which 'instructs the court
to 'tilt' the balance in favor of disclosure.'" (quoting Getman v. NLRB, 450 F. 2d 670,
674 & n.4, stay den., 404 U.S. 1204 (1971)); Celmins v. United States Dep't of Treasury,
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est must clearly outweigh the public's right to know, 1 4  as
demonstrated by case law.11 5
The required balancing analysis was applied to medical
quality data in Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
HEW,"6 when a nonprofit consumer advocacy group sought dis-
closure under FOIA of a Professional Standard Review Organi-
zation's ("PSRO") 1 7 health care quality data. These data in-
cluded physician-specific data linked to mortality outcome data.
The court held, among other things, that the data did not fall
within the medical file exemption.11 8 The physicians' privacy in-
terest, while genuine, was deemed to be less than that of inti-
mate, personal information." 9 Thus, the public interest of scru-
457 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1977) ("It is settled, however, that the courts are to 'tilt' in
favor of disclosure").
114 Campbell v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 539 F.2d 58, 62 (10th Cir.
1976):
[w]here there is an important public interest in obtaining information, the pri-
vate interest in protecting the disclosure must give way to the superior public
interest, especially where the [privacy] invasion is not substantial. If, of course,
[the privacy invasion] is serious and there is little or no public interest, disclos-
ure is not allowed.
Id. at 62.
25 See Florida Medical Ass'n, Inc. v. Department of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, 479 F. Supp. 1291, 1304 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (disclosure of physicians' Medicare reim-
bursements was not permitted since inclusion of personally identifying details consti-
tuted a privacy interest strong enough to outweigh the weaker public interest in knowing
these amounts in light of ongoing legislative debate over national health insurance);
Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Services, 690 F.2d
252, 261-65 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (strong public oversight interest, when balanced against the
officials' relatively slight privacy interest, required disclosure of financial data indicating
potential conflicts of interest and abuse of official position).
477 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1979).
'7 See supra note 18.
18 "The court concludes that the invasion of personal privacy resulting from the
disclosure of certain non-patient-identifiable records is not 'clearly unwarranted' in light
of the important public interests at stake." Public Citizen, 477 F. Supp. at 605.
219 Courts have strongly protected disclosure of "intimate" personal details of indi-
vidual lives. See, e.g., Rural Housing Alliance v. Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 77
(D.C. Cir. 1974) (exemption 6 used to protect records of a person's alcoholic consump-
tion, the legitimacy of children, marital status, identities of fathers of children, family
fights and reputation); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. Internal Revenue Service, 502 F.2d 133,
137 (3d Cir. 1974) (exemption 6 used to protect person's family status and personal ac-
tivities within the home); Ditlow v. Schultz, 517 F.2d 166, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (exemp-
tion 6 used to guard against disclosure of a person's finances).
Courts have also held that certain "professional" information is characterized by a
privacy interest and thus not to be disclosed. See Florida Medical Ass'n, 479 F. Supp. at
1304-5 (Medicare reimbursements received by physicians constitute personal information
not subject to disclosure under FOIA's exemption 6); Professional Review Organization
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tinizing government performance served by Public Citizen
outweighed the physicians' relatively weak personal privacy
interest.120
In Public Citizen the district court applied a balancing test
weighing the physicians' privacy interests and the general pub-
lic's interest in government information. The court considered
the following factors for both patients and physicians: "(1) will
disclosure result in an invasion of privacy and, if so, how seri-
ously?; (2) what public interest factors favor, oppose, disclosure
and what weight should they be accorded?' 12 1 Patient privacy,
usually the paramount concern, was minor since the data sought
did not include any information that could either directly or in-
directly identify individual patients.12
The Public Citizen court acknowledged that the physicians'
privacy interest was genuine since "disclosure of physician iden-
tities in ... [medical care evaluation] studies raises the prospect
of misleading publicity, possibly unwarranted professional and
public criticism, and damage to professional reputation."' 23 But
the court did not find that "[t]he revelation that a physician
performs a large number of surgical procedures, or has requests
for [hospital] extension denied regularly" to be "intimate" infor-
mation. 24 Nor would the "professional embarrassment suffered"
of Florida v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Services, 607 F. Supp. 423, 427
(D.D.C. 1985) (professional credentials and other personal information in resumes were
privacy interests to be protected under FOIA's exemption 6).
But courts have also held that there is no privacy interest in certain "professional"
information. See Sims v. Central Intelligence Agency, 642 F.2d 562, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
("[T]he decisions of this court have established that information connected with profes-
sional relationships does not qualify for.., exemption 6 .... "); Cohen v. Environmental
Protection Agency, 575 F. Supp. 425, 429 (D.D.C. 1983) ("[T]he privacy exemption does
not apply to information regarding professional or business activities.... This informa-
tion must be disclosed even if a professional reputation must be tarnished"). At the same
time, courts have held that there is a relatively weak privacy interest in "professional"
information. See Kurzon v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Services, 649 F.2d
65, 69 (1st Cir. 1981) (protection of privacy interest, in this case the possible negative
reflection cast on applicants for government research grants upon rejection, "is not be-
yond the purview of exemption 6," but "it is not at its core.").
120 Public Citizen, 477 F. Supp. at 605.
121 Id. at 603.
122 Id. at 601.
222 See supra note 112.
' See supra note 119, for cases where the "intimate" requirement was met. The
Public Citizen court found that the data sought did not possess the "intimacy" of those
cases.
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by data disclosure lead to immediate, personal consequences,
such as "continuous harassment or threats of reprisal."'125 In ad-
dition, the information sought was derived solely from services
paid for by public funds, and since the physicians contracted
with the government to provide medical services in exchange for
federal payments, they perform a "quasi-public function, to
which substantial personal privacy rights could not attach.'2 20
The Public Citizen court balanced the physicians' privacy
interest against the general public's interest in disclosure, the
foremost interest being increased consumer knowledge of the
quality of government-funded medical services. Thus, according
to the court, disclosure would permit consumers to make more
informed choices among individual physicians and hospitals. 27
It would also allow other physicians outside the community to
make better referrals to providers within the community.228
Health planning agencies and health quality researchers would
also benefit from the information. 28 The court also reasoned
that a more informed public would put pressure on PSROs to
improve their monitoring efforts.130 The court then concluded
that not only was a physician's personal privacy interest of lesser
magnitude than that of a general citizen's intimate personal in-
terest, but the physicians' personal privacy interest was also
weak when compared to the general public's interest in
disclosure.13 1
In summary, it is likely that a court will find that physician-
specific quality-of-care data qualify as a medical file for the pur-
poses of FOIA exemption 6. A court will also be likely to deter-
mine that a genuine privacy interest for physicians exists. How-
ever, as demonstrated in Public Citizen, a court is likely to hold
that invasions of physicians' privacy are greatly outweighed by
public interest in disclosure. If Public Citizen is any indication,
115 Public Citizen, 477 F. Supp. at 604. The defense analogized the potential profes-
sional embarrassment caused by the disclosure of the physicians' identities to the dis-
closure of F.B.L personnel names involved in the investigation of the assassination of
Martin Luther King, Jr., which were protected under exemption 6 in Lesar v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 455 F. Supp. 921, 925 (D.D.C. 1978).
120 Public Citizen, 477 F. Supp. at 604.
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 605.
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exemption 6 will probably not block disclosure of physician-spe-
cific data under a FOIA request.
Exemption 4 prohibits disclosure of information that is
"commercial or financial, obtained from a person, and privileged
or confidential. 13 2 Physician-specific quality-of-care data may
qualify as "commercial" information since the marketability of
physician services would be affected by disclosure. In fact, get-
ting market information relating to the quality of physician ser-
vices would be an important goal of one seeking disclosure.
Case law indicates that where disclosure of information may
affect a commercial interest, such as marketability, that infor-
mation could fall within the "commercial" exemption. In Public
Citizen Health Research Group v. F.D.A.133 the court held that
records produced during ongoing clinical safety studies relating
to adverse medical reactions of intraocular lenses submitted to
the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA"), a federal agency,
by a manufacturer were "commercial" since that information
"will be instrumental in gaining market approval. ' 13 4
However, the term "commercial" is often given its ordinary
meaning by courts.13 5 In Public Citizen Health Research Group
v. HEW138 the court held that medical care evaluation studies
requested were not "commercial" since they did not contain fee
data, payment schedules or other commercial arrangements.
Thus, although a court might find that physician-specific qual-
ity-of-care data are "commercial," such a holding is highly
unlikely.13 7
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4).
1" Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Food and Drug Admin., 704 F.2d 1280
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
184 Id. at 1290.
131 Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of Health and Human Services, 690
F.2d 252, 266 (D.C. Cir. 1982). "[T]he statutory language is not, on its face, restricted to
commercial as opposed to personal financial information ... we believe that the plain
language of Exemption 4 covers all financial information, despite the apparent commer-
cial focus of the Exemption." See also Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. Com-
modities Futures Trading Comm'n, 627 F.2d 392, 403 n.78 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (further ex-
amples of construing the term "commercial").
I Public Citizen, 477 F. Supp. at 605.
'37 Moreover, even if the information is considered to be commercial, exemption 4
still would not apply. The exemption mandates that the information be "obtained from a
person." Board of Trade, 627 F.2d at 404. Physician-specific data obtained by the HCFA
are received from hospitals, not from the physician opposing disclosure. Thus it is un-
likely that a court would find that exemption 4 applies.
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FOIA also exempts matters "specifically exempted from dis-
closure by statute" under exemption 3. The Social Security Act
specifically prohibits disclosure of Medicare information "except
as the Secretary ... may by regulation prescribe." 138 This ex-
emption could apply if the Social Security Act language is inter-
preted as a statutory disclosure exemption. In Parkridge Hospi-
tal, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Tennessee59 the court
held that the Social Security Act's language did not constitute
an exemption statute within the meaning of FOIA.140 The court
found that this clause merely grants discretion to the Secretary
of HHS to exempt."' Thus, it does not appear that exemption 3
can be used to block disclosure of physician-specific quality-of-
care data.
In summary, it appears that the disclosure of physician-spe-
cific quality-of-care data will not be exempted under FOLA.
Even if a court did decide that the information was both "commercial" and "ob-
tained from a person," the information must still be deemed "confidential." Commercial
information is "confidential" for purposes of exemption 4 if its disclosure would either
"(1)... impair the Government's ability to obtain necessary information in the future;
or (2) ... cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom
the information was obtained." National Parks and Conservation Assn v. Morton, 493
F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Case law suggests that the first prong of the confidential-
ity test would not be met. Florida Medical Ass'n Inc. v. United States Dep't of Health,
Education, and Welfare, 479 F. Supp. 1291, 1303 (ID. Fin. 1979)(where the information
submitted was mandated as a part of doing business with the government, more specifi-
cally, where information contained in Medicare claims form was required for reimburse-
ment, no impairment was found).
For the second prong of the confidentiality test (substantial competitive harm),
courts have not ruled on provider-specific quality-of-care data. But courts have held,
both for and against substantial competitive harm, on analogous Medicare cost reports.
Id. (no substantial harm); Parkridge Hospital, Inc. v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Tennessee, 430 F. Supp. 1093 (E.D. Tenn. 1977) (substantial harm). Medicare cost re-
ports are to a hospital's competitive position what physician-specific quality-of-care data
reports are to a physician's competitive position.
Substantial competitive harm may be present if only a single physician's outcomes
were disclosed, while all other physicians' outcomes were not. But physician-specific
quality-of-care data reports would include all physicians under the Medicare program,
and thus would affect all physicians equally. Westchester Gen. Hosp. v. United States
Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare, 464 F. Supp. 236, 246 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (dicta).
Thus, it is unlikely that the information will be considered confidential under the second
prong of the confidentiality test. In summary, it is improbable that physician-specific
information will qualify as confidential commercial data obtained from a person as re-
quired by exemption 4.
- 42 U.S.C. § 1306(a).
139 Parkridge Hospital, Inc., 430 F. Supp. at 1093.
140 Id. at 1097.
141 Id.
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Thus, a physician opposing disclosure of quality-of-care data
correlated to his or her identity will be powerless to object, not-
withstanding the Privacy Act.
b. Peer Review Organizations
By statute, PROs are not considered a federal agency for
the purposes of FOIA and may only disclose confidential data
"under such circumstances as the Secretary shall by regulations
provide." '142 The Secretary's regulations regarding hospital-spe-
cific information concerning Medicare patients, whether implic-
itly or explicitly identifying the hospital (or health care facility),
are considered nonconfidential 43 and must be made available to
the public by the state PRO.144 Specifically, PRO regulatory
guidelines require disclosure of mortality rates for various diag-
nostic related groups, the number of patients who develop post-
operative infections, the average length of hospital stays, and
the cost and volume of various procedures. 1"
PROs may not disclose physician-specific data to the public,
since information that identifies a health-care practitioner is
considered confidential.1 46 FOIA analysis for federal agencies
that may otherwise permit disclosure does not apply. However,
PROs must disclose confidential information to HHS upon
HHS's request. 147 The PRO law also requires that PROs disclose
confidential information, which may include physician-specific
quality-of-care data, to (1) state or federal fraud and abuse
agencies; (2) state or federal agencies responsible for identifying
substantial public health risks; and (3) state licensing or certifi-
cation agencies. 148 Once the information is in the possession of a
federal or a state agency, it is subject to FOIA or state freedom
of information laws. This creates the possibility of redisclosure
to the public.
However, because HHS did not intend PROs to disclose
physician-specific data, it is unlikely that HHS will undermine
142 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320c-9(a) (1982). This statutory provision was probably added to
prevent a repeat of the Public Citizen case.
M' 42 C.F.R. § 476.101 (1986).
"4 50 Fed. Reg. 15,312-74 (1985).
142 50 Fed. Reg. 15,312-74 (1985).
148 42 C.F.R. § 476.101 (1986).
24- 42 C.F.R. § 476.130 (1986).
42 C.F.R. § 1320c-9(b) (1982).
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confidentiality by voluntarily disclosing PRO information in its
possession and leaving the door open for a FOIA challenge. If
HHS does voluntarily disclose confidential PRO data, it will
probably not disclose them frequently, thereby limiting opportu-
nities for FOIA challenges.149 But even if a FOIA challenge is
brought on redisclosed data, it is unlikely to succeed.
Redisclosure by federal or state fraud, abuse, public health,
licensing or certification agencies will likely involve information
about a single or small group of physicians. A FOIA (or state
counterpart) challenge based on arguments of public interest in
increased health care quality, or reduced costs through increased
competition, will be severely weakened by the limited focus of
the information sought. In this case, it is likely that courts will
find physicians' privacy interests superior to the public interest.
Thus, exemption 6 of FOIA will apply and disclosure will be
blocked by the Privacy Act.
2. State Law: State Agencies and Private Organizations
under Contract to State Agencies
Thirty-two states have established agencies for the collec-
tion of hospital discharge data;1 0 twenty-five of those states col-
50 Fed. Reg. 15,355 (1985).
15o Generally, all these statutes provide for collection of data to be used to generate
either cost, utilization, or quality-of-care comparative statistics: Arizona, Aiuz. Ray. STAT.
ANN. § 36-125.05 (1990); Arkansas, AR. CODE ANN. § 20-8-110(a) (Michie 1987); Califor-
nia, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 443.31 (West 1991); Colorado, COLO. RE. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-28-104 (West 1991); Connecticut, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-160 (West 1991);
Delaware, DFL CODE ANN. § 2003-2004 (1975-1990); Florida, FLA. STAT. ANm. § 381.0612
(West 1991); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-281 (Michie 1982); Illinois, ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 111/2 para. 6504-2 (Smith-Hurd 1992); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 16-10-5-2(e) (West
1991); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 145.3 (West 1991); Maine, Ma. RE. STAT. ANN. § 394
(West 1990); Maryland, h. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 19-107 (1988); Maqsachusetts,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., Ch. 111 § 25A (West 1992); Nevada, NEy. REv. STAT. ANN. §
439A.082 (Michie 1985); New Hampshire, N.H. RE. STAT. ANN. § 126:1 (1990); New
Jersey, NJ. STAT ANN. § 26:2H-5.1 (West 1992); New Mexico, N.I. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-14a-
1-10 (Michie 1978); New York, N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAiW § 2803-b (McKinney 1991)
(mandatory SPARCS data system, not voluntary Cardiac Reporting System); North Car-
olina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-210 (1990); North Dakota, NJ). CENAr. CODE § 23.01.1
(1987-1991); Ohio, OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 3732.11-15 (Anderson 1987); Oregon, OR. Ray
STAT. § 442.120'(1989); Pennsylvania, 35 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 449.1-19 (1991); Rhode Is-
land, RI GEN LAWS § 23-17-10 (1956); South Carolina, S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-6-170(c)
(Law Co-op. 1976); Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. § 68-1-108 (1955-1991); Texas, TM
HEALTH & SAFEr CODE ANN. §§ 311.031-038 (West 1991); Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. §
1952 (1983); Washington, WAsH RE. CODE ANN. § 70.170.100 (West 1991); West Vir-
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lect physician identifiers as part of the data.1 51 The majority of
states prohibit disclosure of provider-specific quality-of-care
data 5 2 to the public.153 A few states, especially those that seek
"market-like" competition to control cost and quality, mandate
disclosure of comparative quality-of-care statistics." 4 However,
some of these states do not permit the disclosure of the raw in-
put data from which these statistics were generated and have
further exempted these data from their freedom of information
statutes.
55
For those states that do not disclose quality-of-care data
ginia, W. VA. CODE § 16-1-10 (1990); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT ANN. § 153.05 (West 1991).
151 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Ver-
mont, Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin collect physician identifiers. California,
Florida, Indiana, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon and Texas do not collect physician
identifiers.
152 For this Note, only quality-of-care data are at issue; however, states that collect
data for cost and utilization review can extend these systems in the future to include
quality-of-care data analysis and dissemination on either a hospital-specific or physician.
specific basis. Also, data collected for cost or utilization may also be subject to freedom
of information requests. This leads to the possibility of private-sector analysis of col-
lected data to generate quality-of-care statistics; if physician identifiers have been col-
lected, then it is possible to generate physician-specific data as well as hospital-specific
data.
153 Disclosure of provider-specific quality-of-care data is unavailable in those states
listed in note 149, supra, except for those states listed in note 154, infra.
"' Public release of hospital-specific quality-of-care statistics is mandated in the
following states: Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. § 25-28-104(3)(b)(II) (West 1991); Delaware,
DEL. CODE ANN. § 2003(c) (1975-1990) (however, no data can be released without first
obtaining the written approval of the Association of Delaware Hospitals); Florida, FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 381.0612(2)(j)&(5) (West 1991); Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-281(a)
(Michie 1982); Illinois, ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 111 2 para. 6504-2(b), (e), (1) (Smith-Hurd
1992); Iowa, IOWA CODE ANN. § 145.3(3)(c) (West 1991); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN.. tit.
22, § 388(3) (West 1990); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-14A-7 (Michie 1978);
North Carolina, N.C. GEN. CODE § 23-01.1-02 (1987-1991); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT.
§8 449.7 (1991); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 153.05(1) (West 1991).
Public disclosure of physician-specific quality-of-care data is available in the follow-
ing states: Colorado, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-28-104(3)(b)(II) (West 1991); Georgia,
GA. CODE ANN. § 31-7-281(a) (Michie 1982); Pennsylvania, PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 449.7
(1991); Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 153.45(3) (West 1991).
155 Illinois has exempted disclosure of raw provider data and some hospital-specific
data from its Freedom of Information statute. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 1111/2 para. 6504-2-(b)
(Smith-Hurd 1992). Similarly, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa and New Mexico have exempted
raw data from disclosure under their freedom of information laws, but not analyzed hos-
pital-specific data. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-28-104(2)(b) (West 1991); GA. CODE ANN. §
31-7-285(d) (Michie 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 145.2(b) (West 1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. 8
24-14A-8 (Michie 1978).
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within their possession and have not exempted them from their
freedom of information statutes, the approach to determine
whether disclosure is available generally follows that of FOIA.56
A New York court recently decided the leading case mandating
disclosure of physician-specific quality-of-care data under a
state freedom of information law.1 7
New York's State Health Department had prepared official
rankings of heart surgeons based on risk-adjusted mortality
rates.""8 These rankings were disclosed to hospitals so that refer-
ring physicians, or patients who obtained the information from
their doctor or hospital, could better choose their cardiac-care
providers.'59 Newsday, a New York newspaper, requested a list
of the rankings through New York's Freedom of Information
Law (FOIL).66 This request was rejected by the Health Depart-
ment on the grounds that disclosing the information would be
an unwarranted invasion of the physicians' personal privacy.' 6 '
This decision was affirmed upon administrative appeal." 2 In
turn, Newsday filed suit to demand disclosure under FOIL,
which was brought before Justice Hughes of the New York State
Supreme Court in Albany. 63 Justice Hughes, ruling that the
public had the right to know the rankings, granted disclosure to
Newsday. He criticized the Health Department's argument that
156 Simpson, supra note 42, at 19-20 n.50.
157 Newsday, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Health, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1477
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1991).
8 Id. These rankings were computed in similar fashion to those computed for hos-
pitals by the New York State Department of Health.
"ihe [Department of Health] press release stressed that the reason for dissem-
inating this information was:
Patients and referring physicians are expected to use this information to assist
them in making decisions on the choice of institutions for cardiac procedure.
Patients should be able to obtain from their doctor or hospitah
1. The performance history of each hospital
2. The performance record of individual surgeons.
3. The risk of mortality for patients based on their individual risk factors
Id.
IGO N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW § 87 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992).
161 N.Y. Pun. OFF. LAW § 89(2) (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1992).
12 Newsday, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Health, 19 Media L Rep. (BNA) 1477
(Sup. Ct. Albany County 1991). Following the administrative appeal, "the New York
State Committee on Open Government issued an advisory opinion concluding that the
information should be disclosed since it disclosed professional activity licensed by the
State, and there was a strong public interest in disclosure." Id.
161 Id. at 1.
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such data would be of "little public benefit" and subject to mis-
use and misunderstanding."" If the Health Department's argu-
ment was extended, it "[would] appear that if members of the
public were more intelligent, it would [then] be in the public
interest to disclose this information. The duty of administrators
to release to the population records of its government cannot be
dependent upon the administrators' assessment of the popula-
tion's intelligence."'61 5 Furthermore, the public interest that
compels the Health Department to disclose information to hos-
pitals also "compels that the information be made available to
the rest of the State."'1 66 Thus it seems probable that physician-
specific, and even more likely hospital-specific, quality-of-care
data in possession of state agencies will be disclosed in response
to a freedom of information request if other states follow New
York's lead.
3. Independent Private Organizations
Generally, private collection organizations not under con-
tract to federal or state agencies, or otherwise governed by fed-
eral or state laws, are not legally obliged to disclose data to the
general public.16 7 Indeed, doing so may result in either tort or
contract liability. 6 8 Liability may be based on defamation, inva-
sion of privacy, betrayal of professional secrets or breach of con-
tract. However, specific legislative or judicial mandates to report
data would absolve private organizations from disclosure liabil-
ity. This Note will not focus on disclosure of provider-specific
quality-of-care data by private organizations.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Should Public Disclosure Be Mandated?
The debate over whether to mandate federal and state agen-
'" Id. at 4.
265 Id.
166 The Department of Health recognized a strong public need for these data when
it released the data to hospitals so that patients could make intelligent decisions about
which cardiac surgeons to choose upon redisclosure of these data by the hospital or phy-
sicians to the patients. Id. See also supra note 159.
"I Simpson, supra note 42, at 21.
168 Id.
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cies to disclose to the public16 9 provider-specific quality-of-care
data brings patients' interests in autonomous decision making in
direct confrontation with providers' interests in preventing un-
just reputational harm. Patients, or health care consumers, 1-
desire as much information as they can get to make an intelli-
gent, rational decision on whether to undergo treatment, and if
so, which doctor should perform the treatment, and if necessary,
which hospital to provide inpatient care.7 If the data were per-
fectly accurate and understandable, providers could not reasona-
"' Public disclosure refers to data already collected and analyzed by state or federal
agencies under state or federal law, and not to privately held data. Public disclosure may
also refer to data collected under a state program in which submission of raw data by
physicians was voluntary instead of mandatory, such as New York's Cardiac Surgical
Reporting System (SPARCS is the mandated system). However, in this case, voluntary
submission by physicians may be chilled. To overcome the chilling effect of mandatory
disclosure, collection might also then have to be mandated. See B.D. Cohen, Take Care
Surgeon Data a Sharp Idea, NEWSDAY, December 24, 1991, at 67.
Those who opposed releasing the information-officials of the Health Depart-
ment and surgeons-argued that surgeons who voluntarily submitted their sta-
tistics to the state would cease cooperating if the statistics, with the surgeons'
names attached, were made public. Tough. If that's the only reason for the
state to sit on this explosive information, the State Legislature can mandate its
compilation and its release as a condition of medical licensure.
Id.
This leaves open the issue of whether the government, as opposed to private agen-
cies, should be involved in collecting and disseminating this type of information, and if
so, to what extent Even if the government is involved in collection and dissemination,
another issue arises of whether the government should then be involved in the analysis
of the raw data, and again, to what extent. These issues will not be fully discussed in this
Note, but some of the background and analysis discussion indicates that the answers to
both issues are yes, and to as large an extent as possible.
First, most states and the federal government are already collecting the data for
other purposes, such as cost and utilization review. Second, the government, through the
Privacy Act, is in the best position to protect patients' privacy rights in the data. The
government may also be less susceptible to provider pressure to distort the results of any
analysis. Also, the government is in a better position to act upon the results if discipli-
nary measures are needed. The government is more accessible to both the consumers and
the providers if changes are needed in the system. Lastly, even if data collection, analysis
and disclosure were done by the private sector, the government would probably need to
regulate the systems closely to insure that the potential for harm to providers and con-
sumers is minimized.
170 Health care consumers also include, for example, the corporation buyer purchas-
ing health care services in a managed care program for its employees.
17 For a discussion of rational decision making, see Twerski & Cohen, supra note 1,
at 627-28. For a discussion of whether a patient must understand the information pro-
vided to him or her, see Cathy J. Jones, Autonomy and Informed Consent in Medical
Decisionmaking: Toward a New Self-Fulfilling Prophecy, 47 WAsmL & LEE L. RE. 379,
388-96 (1990).
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bly oppose disclosure because any reputational harm would be
entirely justified.172
However, the data are not now, nor will they ever be, per-
fect.173 Thus, the potential will always exist for falsely im-
pugning a truly good provider's reputation by incorrectly associ-
ating his or her identity with information indicative of bad
care. 417  Conversely, the same potential exists for harming pa-
tients were they to rely on data that have mistakenly identified
a truly poor provider as good. But imperfect data may still be
adequately accurate, understandable and timely so that the con-
sumer/patient can make an informed, autonomous decision.
Thus whether to mandate disclosure of imperfect provider-spe-
cific care data rests squarely upon balancing the benefits and
costs associated with patients' and providers' interests. If the
potential benefits of increased consumer decision-making ability,
the reduction of low-quality or incompetent caregivers, and the
reduction in health care costs sufficiently outweigh the potential
costs of unjust reputational harm and consumer misreliance,
then public disclosure of these data should be mandated.
1. Benefits of Public Disclosure
a. Increased Decision-Making Ability
Patient autonomy in decision making is not a distinct le-
gally protected interest. 17 5 Patients have no legal recourse if
172 Perfectly accurate information implies that the information is truthful; since de-
famatory liability only exists where the alleged defamatory statement is untrue, there
could not be harm. See generally KEroN, Er AL., supra note 1, § 116 at 839.
173 "It will be an essential feature [of these systems] that outcome measures will be
imperfect. ITihe search for a reasonably fair and reasonably accurate measure (depend-
ing on how one defines "reasonably") is bound to end in frustration." Mark V. Pauly,
The Public Policy Implications of Using Outcome Statistics, 58 BRooK. L. REv. 35
(1992).
All parts of the data system are susceptible to error. Collection may be marred by
mistaken physician identification in the submitted reports or the loss or corruption of
data in the computer database. Statistical analysis is susceptible to errors in the mea-
sured risk factors, i.e., the raw data are not perfect. Also, there are errors in the analysis
models themselves. See supra note 66. Lastly, there may be mistakes made in disclosing
the data, for example, typographical errors.
'74 What is a "truly good" provider? This, of course, can never be determined. In
fact, any measure that could do this would be used instead of statistics. But it is likely
that the data will "sometimes indicate that a provider is worse than the provider really
is." Pauly, supra note 173, at 38.
1 See supra note 1, at 219.
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their autonomous decision-making interests are kept unfulfilled
by the information possessor's refusal to provide them with the
requested data.178 But patient autonomy is the backbone of the
doctrine of informed consent1 77 and the interest of autonomous
medical decision making generally has been protected by both
legislation and case law.17 8 Moreover, the interest has been judi-
cially safeguarded when provider-specific quality-of-care data
disclosure was at issue.1 79
Providing patients,1 0 health-care purchasers 8' and even
17I Id.
11 See supra note 1.
178 Id.
17 See Newsday, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Health, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1477 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1991); Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Dep't of
Health, Education and Welfare, 477 F. Supp. 595 (D.D.C. 1979), rev'd on other grounds,
668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
1"0 A patient would use the data to select a physician and/or hospital for treatment.
See supra note 14. See also Tanne, supra note 11, at 39 (describing former New York
State Department of Health Commissioner Dr. David Axelrod's efforts to implement a
program of patient information); Heart Surgery, supra note 79 ("This year, the Depart-
ment of Health will publish a patient's brochure on cardiac surgery. This brochure will
explain the ratings given to hospitals, the different risk factors affecting individual pa-
tient outcomes and the process of choosing a cardiac surgeon."). It is realistic to expect a
patient to desire the best-quality provider for treatment, especially when the treatment
is critical to that person's survival. A value-conscious patient may instead desire the best
quality physician obtainable at a given cost, especially if that person has no insurance
coverage. See Bunis, supra note 15, at 4 ("As many as 37 million [American] people ...
have no medical insurance at all"). As a member of a managed care program, a patient
may use the data to select a primary care physician, see supra note 15, or even choose
not to participate in managed care.
Gone are the days when most patients went to the doctor of their choice, filed
a claim with their employer or union and waited for a check covering 80 per-
cent or more of the bill [describing traditional indemnity insurance coverage,
such as provided by Blue Cross/Blue Shield, where patients have complete
freedom to choose hospitals and doctors]. Increasingly, patients must get per-
mission for treatment beforehand [a part of utilization review], choose a doctor
less on the basis of expertise than on cost or what insurance plan the doctor is
in ....
Bunis et al, supra note 15, at 4.
When a person enters a managed care plan, the person loses much control over the
choice of provider. A person may not choose to enter a managed care progrm--or may
choose one over another-if the physician or hospital of choice, based on use of provider-
specific quality of care data, is not part of the plan.
181 Health-care purchasers are not covered by the doctrine of informed consent as
are patients. However, the increased decision-making ability offered by disclosure of pro-
vider-specific information applies equally to them. Provider-specific data will provide a
numerical assessment of quality; when combined with cost information, it will also pro-
vide a numerical indication of value. Purchasers of medical services may become the
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physicians18 2 with provider-specific quality-of-care data will in-
crease their ability to make a more informed decision, but only
if the data are timely, accurate, understandable and well-
presented. The data-the only numerical evaluation of a pro-
vider's performance available'as-quantify some elements of the
primary users of provider-specific information, as managed care and utilization review
continue to grow. See supra note 15. These purchasers include employers
[P]urchasers, such as GM, are becoming just as concerned about the quality of
providers that service their enrollees ... [wie anticipate that in the near future
these [computer] systems also will allow us to audit providers for their per-
formance and answer questions such as: which providers had clinically accept-
able outcomes, and what did it cost to achieve these outcomes? In simplest
terms did the patient get, better (quality), and what did it cost (efficiency)?
Butler, supra note 22, at 90. See also Pamela Taulbee, Data Management: Winning the
Numbers Game, BUSINESS AND HEALTH Vol. 9, Issue 12 at 27 (1991) [hereinafter Data
Management] (discussing Alcoa Corporation's application of provider-specific
data-provided by a private organization, Alpha Health Network, an association of seven
hospitals in western Pennsylvania-to spot problems); Outcomes Management, supra
note 22, at 28 (discussing the Orange County Public School System use of provider-
specific data, collected by the Florida Health Care Cost Commission, see supra note 149,
and analyzed using the MQ-Pinpoint software system designed by Mediqual Inc., to im-
prove quality and reduce medical costs); Pamela Taulbee, Measuring Hospitals by Out-
comes, Bus. AND HEALTH, Vol. 8, Issue 11, at 20 (1990) [hereinafter Measuring Hospitals]
(Hershey Foods uses data collected and analyzed by Pennsylvania's Health Care Cost
Containment Council, see supra note 149, to identify those hospitals with the best value
and then provide this information to their employees.). Other purchasers include man-
aged care organizations. See Data Management, supra, at 27 (discussing use of provider-
specific quality-of-care data by United Healthcare Corp., a managed care company with
1.2 million members, to develop better methods to improve delivery of care.). Other pur-
chasers are insurers. See McIlrath, Blues Officials Using Doctors Profiles as Major Tool
in Keeping Down Costs, AM. MED. NEWS, Vol., 35, Issue 5, at 1. "Six years ago, based on
an analysis of their practice patterns, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Arizona dropped
more than 300 physicians it regarded as 'egregious outliers.'" Id. Arizona Blues uses the
doctor profiles and credentialing information to select doctors for its managed care pro-
grams; D.C. Blues is experimentally using the data in which payment will be based
partly on how efficient doctors deliver services.
182 Physicians, although not protected under the doctrine of informed consent,
nonetheless can benefit from the increased decision-making ability these data provide.
Physicians may use these data to refer patients to specialists and hospitals. See Cardiac
Surgery, supra note 79 ("[R]eferring physicians are expected to use this information to
assist them in making decisions on the choice of institutions for cardiac procedures."). A
physician new to a community, or just out of medical school, may use this information to
select a hospital at which to practice. See Tanne, supra note 11, at 38.
183 Outcome measures are the only quantitative method of currently assessing pro-
ider quality. "The traditional measures of quality care, such as the number of board-
certified physicians and the number of nurses per bed, offer little, if any, information on
the effectiveness of the care being delivered. It is the outcome of care, that is, mortality,
changes in morbidity, excessive lengths of stay caused by occurrences at the hospital
(hospital-induced infections or error like leaving a sponge in), that must be analyzed to
assess effectiveness." Josephine G. Kaple & Nancy L. Cannon, A Path Through the
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provider's competency either on an overall or procedure-specific
basis.18 4 These quantitative data, when combined with qualita-
tive information users may already possess, give users more deci-
sion-making capability than would be available with qualitative
information alone. 85
Managed Care Maze, BESTs REV.-LIFE-HEALTH INs. EDION, Vol. 89, Issue 6, at 62
(1988). Another contemplated measure has been the number of malpractice lawsuits that
the provider has either lost or been involved in. Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep., (BNA)
Vol. 50, Issue 1271, at 1154 (1986); Pens. Rep., (BNA) Vol. 12, Issue 37, at 1271 (1935).
18, See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
Increased decision-making ability via use of quantitative data depends upon bow
well patients can digest these data. Large-scale purchasers should generally have no
problem interpreting the data; they usually have professionals on staff well-versed in
outcomes analysis. The Orange County Public School System hired an executive vith
more than 20 years of managed care experience and a board member of the Central
Florida Health Care Coalition to supervise its data review; also, the Cleveland Health
Quality Choice Program uses the services of the Quality Information Management Coun-
cil, the members of which are "non-aligned [and have] impeccable credentials", to ana-
lyze and present data to it. Outcomes Management, supra note 22, at 28.
Neither should physicians, being medical professionals, have any trouble interpret-
ing the health-care data. However, physician-specific quality-of-care data may be more
difficult for the unaided patient to understand and use properly.
The reports are complex, and the average person would have a hard time com-
ing to much of a conclusion based on them For example, opening the report to
the page headed "Chest Pain (Severe)" one sees columns listing hospitals,
number of patients, average stay, average patient severity, observed and ex-
pected mortality, and major morbidity. But is a difference between an ex-
pected mortality of 0.30 and 0.33 significant? Is it explained by differences in
average patient severity? By slight differences in average patient age? Laymen
are unlikely to know.
Measuring Hospitals, supra note 181, at 20.
This is why data presentation is critical to the successful use of these data. See
supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text and infra notes 222-26 and accompanying text.
If done properly, it can make the numerical information easier to understand and use.
But even after data have been disclosed in an easy-to-understand fashion, patients
may not understand all aspects of what the numbers mean. In this case, they vill need
the assistance of friends, family, and their employers. Measuring Hospitals, supra note
181, at 20 C" 'But the employer's role is a critical one', says Alan Geer, employee benefits
manager... 'Companies will have to analyze the information, summarize it further and
share it with employees.' "). In addition, patients will need support from both hospitals
and physicians. Cardiac Surgery, supra note 79 ("Patients considering cardiac surgery
should discuss this new information with their physicians, in particular the cardiologist,
who provides most cardiac surgery referrals."). Nonetheless, there will always be patients
who will not be able to understand this data; hopefully, with increased consumer educa-
tion and better efforts by physicians, hospitals, and federal and state health departments
to keep the public informed, the number of these patients will decrease in time.
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b. Reduction of Low-Quality Providers
Provider-specific data may also be used to detect and iden-
tify low-quality provider performance.""' From this, the number
of low-quality providers may be reduced by the following meth-
ods: (1) the providers may modify and correct their procedures,
practices, and skills so that their performance is enhanced to ac-
ceptable levels;'87 (2) if uncorrectable, the provider's license to
practice the procedure in question may be revoked; 88 or (3) the
low-quality provider is driven out of business by market
forces.' Generally, this reduction of providers is a benefit since
the loss of service can be filled by more competent caregivers,
le In addition to patients and health-care purchasers, PROs and hospitals use the
data to uncover quality-of-care problems caused by either poor physicians or poor medi-
cal procedures. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. Measuring Hospitals, supra
note 181, at 20.
Many people feel that the first group to use these data will be hospitals them-
selves. They're going to take a very close look at their operations and try to
determine why they're doing better with respect to some DRGs and not so well
with others".. . . We can't minimize the value of these data as an internal
management tool [for hospitals].
Id.
187 Corrective methods are the main force behind outcomes analysis, since not only
are no provider services lost, but the overall quality of care is enhanced. If one examines
the latest rankings of hospitals released by the New York State Department of Health,
one notes that the worst risk-adjusted mortality rate was only 8%; 92% of the patients
(on a risk-adjusted basis) did not die! See infra Appendix Table 3. Thus, punishment is
not always in order, just improvement. Often providers are not aware that a problem
exists-the data makes them see that it does. "That's the purpose of this [data collection
and analysis] program [of the New York State's Cardiac Surgery Reporting System];
gathering information, not to punish those that don't measure up, but to identify
problems and correct them." PBS's "A Time for Change," supra note 6.
[Data management] should help find flaws in medical and surgical procedures.
"We believe there's been unfair and ill-conceived attention on physicians, and
it's an all-too-common belief that the purpose of [this quality data] is to root
out the bad physicians," asserts research and development vice president for
United HealthCare Corporation, [Sheila] Leatherman.
Data Management, supra note 181, at 27.
188 Punishment is always an option if there is a serious threat to the public. See
supra note 18. As an alternative, the license to practice may be suspended, or the pro-
vider may be put on probation until corrective measures are taken. See supra note 20.
189 Low-quality providers can be driven out of business in three ways: (1) patients
will, over time, choose only the top providers, thus reducing the financial incentive for
low-quality providers to remain in business; (2) major health care purchasers will select
only the top providers to participate in their managed care programs (direct contracting)
or provide financial incentives to those who provide the highest quality/lowest cost
health care; and (3) physicians will stop referring patients to low-quality providers. See
infra note 191.
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thus increasing overall health care.190
c. Reduction of Health Care Costs Through Increased
Provider Competition
Supplying provider-specific care data to the public may also
increase the competitiveness of the health care market, poten-
tially reducing the staggering health care costs currently facing
this nation.191 Large purchasers of health care services, for ex-
ample, a large corporation choosing a health maintenance organ-
ization ("HMO"), may especially benefit."9 2 Of course, this po-
190 This is mainly true for large metropolitan and suburban areas, but may not hold
true for small cities and rural communities. In smaller communities market-like competi-
tion will play less of a role .and there is less likely to be as drastic a reduction in low-
quality providers as compared to a large city. See Measuring Hospitals, supra note 181,
at 20. In discussing compare and select strategies using provider-specific quality-of-care
data, it is noted that strategies change for small communities with few hospitals. Since
selection may be limited, employers are encouraged to develop close relationships with
local hospitals, or use their position as major health care purchasers to motivate the
hospital to make some quality improvements. Id. Also, rural providers may be exempted
from being listed in rankings or reporting data to the government collection agencies.
See infra notes 227-29 and accompanying text.
191 Dr. C. Everett Koop, former Surgeon General, estimates the yearly cost of health
care in 1990 was $660 billion. Of that amount, researchers estimate that one third of this
figure is unnecessary. PBS's "A Time for Change," supra note 6. More recent estimates
put figures at $700 billion a year. Dr. Alan B. Cohen, Vice President and Director, Office
of Health Statistics and Analysis, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Address at the
Brooklyn Law School Symposium Comparing Medical Providers, January 9, 1992 (on
file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
192 The health care industry was essentially exempt from competitive pressure until
the 1970s, shielded from both antitrust laws and pro-competitive legislation. Greaney,
supra note 21, at 180. Since then, however, a combination of judicial actions and changes
in publicly funded reimbursement programs has removed most of the antitrust immunity
from the health care industry, leaving it to laws encouraging HMs and other alternate
care providers. Id. Although deregulation is still not complete, many federal and state
health care market regulations have been greatly relaxed. Id. However, "promoting com-
petition does not eliminate the need for government regulation... as both the regulator
of health professionals and institutions and the purchaser of health services, the govern-
ment can efficiently gather, process, and distribute information that is comprehensible
and that will help competitive markets function." Id. at 204-205. "[P]ublic agencies can
monitor health and medical outcomes. They could then pass along to buyers both aggre-
gate information reflecting the efficacy of different kinds of delivery systems, or treat-
ments and provider-specific information that could help buyers make judgments on
price, quality, and utilization." Id. at 205.
Federal and state governments originally became involved in provider-specific pric-
ing data as a method of controlling costs via competition. "The centerpiece of legislative
actions taken by the [Iowa] General Assembly in 1983 to control hospital costs was the
creation of the Iowa Health Data Commission. The Commission is assisting hospitals and
third party payers in the implementation of uniform hospital billing, and is beginning
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tential savings must be offset against the costs of data collection
and disclosure.'93 However, some experts in health care manage-
ment and some recent case histories indicate that there will
probably be a net reduction in costs.9 4
2. Costs of Public Disclosure
a. Unjust Reputational Harm
Providers' fear that truly good providers will be incorrectly
or unjustly associated with data indicating they are low-quality
providers, thus harming their reputations, and eventually lead-
the collection, analysis, and dissemination of hospital-specific pricing information. The
public disclosure of timely and comparable hospital-specific pricing information could
greatly affect hospital prices if third party payers, armed with this information, become
prudent buyers of hospital, services, thereby stimulating hospitals to engage in price
competition." Josephine Gittler, Hospital Cost Containment in Iowa: A Guide for State
Public Policy Makers, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1263, 1301-02 (1984). See supra note 38.
However, price competition, mainly achieved through discounting, only attacked one
side of the value equation. See supra note 22. Discounting "simply squeezed one end of
the balloon ... [s]o, overall, health care inflation kept rising unabated." See Outcomes
Management, supra note 22, at 28. The other side of the value equation, quality, can
now be equally attacked as numerical, comparative data on providers becomes available.
See supra note 180. "Tightly managed, coordinated care networks with quantitative
quality measures leading to outcomes management ... is unequivocally going to drive
the financial relationships between providers and purchasers," stated Dr. Jacques
Sokolov, Vice President and medical director of Southern California Edison, the nation's
second largest utility. See Julie Johnson, Managed Care in the 1990s: Provider's New
Role for Innovative Health Delivery, 66 HosPITALs 26 (1992).
Once provider value is determined, purchasers may "shop around" and either offer
financial incentives to employees to use, if under a tradition indemnity arrangement, or
selectively contract with the most efficient and/or highest quality provider to service
their employees. By offering employees incentives and sharing quantitative quality data
with them, employers can wean them away from low-quality, high-cost providers. See
Outcomes Management, supra note 22, at 28.
193 It is estimated that the cost of data collection and dissemination would be ap-
proximately $100 million a year, seven thousand times less than the total cost of health
care. Dr. Alan B. Cohen, Vice President and Director, Office of Health Statistics and
Analysis, Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Address at the Brooklyn Law School Sym-
posium: Comparing Medical Providers, January 9, 1992 (on file with the Brooklyn Law
Review).
'" Since data systems are relatively new, actual cost-savings through use of this
data are not in yet. However, using data collected by the Florida Health Care Cost Com-
mission, analysts estimated that purchasers in the Orlando region were spending $29
million on inappropriate care and $27 million on ineffective care, with a potential savings
of $100 million. Outcomes Management, supra note 22, at 28. Collected data are also
used to check for appropriateness of care. It is estimated that 30% of all procedures and
diagnoses are unnecessary, saving more than $50 billion a year. See PBS's "A Time For
Change," supra note 6.
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ing to substantial financial losses, ruined careers, or hospital
closings.195 These misassociations, providers maintain, will be
caused by the public's misinterpretation of complex data or in-
accuracies in the data themselves.190 Thus, they argue the infor-
mation must be withheld from the public.197
Providers argue that the data are too complex to be under-
stood by the public and thus subject to misinterpretation and
misuse. However, this argument has several flaws. First, the pa-
tient must already make a difficult decision on whether to have
the surgery, or what type of surgery to have, based in part on
complex general risk data the provider must provide the patient
before obtaining the patient's consent for treatment.9 8 How can
providers argue that patients are able to understand and assess
complex general risk information in deciding whether to undergo
treatment or select among alternative treatments, but those
same patients are unable to understand complex specific risk in-
formation used to select a provider? Alternatively, is the deci-
sion to have surgery with Provider A rather than Provider B just
an extension of selecting an "alternate treatment" under the
doctrine of informed consent?' 9
The critical difference between a decision based on general
risk information and one based on provider-specific information
is not that the data are too complex to understand, but on whom
the costs of making an incorrect decision fall and what those
costs are. When a patient incorrectly uses general risk informa-
tion, whether because the patient fails to understand 2 0 or can-
not rationally assess 201 the data, the brunt of the costs fall on
the patient. In this case, the costs of the incorrect decision, i.e.
the patient should have undergone treatment, but did not (or
vice-versa), or the patient chose the wrong type of treatment,
may result in some physical harm to the patient or increased
expenses incurred by the patient. However, when a patient in-
correctly uses provider-specific data in selecting the treating
I'l See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
196 Id.
197 Id.
199 See supra note 4.
19 See Hunter L. Prillaman, A Physician's Duty to Inform of Newly Developed
Therapy, 6. J. CoNTEiP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 43, 43-46 (1990).
200 See supra note 171.
201 Id.
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provider, providers not chosen bear the brunt of the largely eco-
nomic costs. This is because the highest risk in decision making
involves the election to be treated and which treatment to have,
not who performs the treatment.202 Thus, it appears that provid-
ers only complain of data complexity when they, not the pa-
tient/consumer, bear the costs of their potential misuse.
Second, if providers are truly concerned about the possibil-
ity of being adversely affected by misuse of the data, they can
make an effort to clarify the information for the patient's com-
prehension just as they must do in disclosing complex general
risk data. The public should not need medical degrees to under-
stand this information, nor should it be required to understand
complex statistical analysis. Instead, proper presentation and
suitable analogies can make the information understandable and
user-friendly to most consumers; in addition, employers that ac-
tively participate in managed care programs can also analyze
and digest some of the more complex data so that their employ-
ees can more easily understand them.20 3
Third, not all disclosed data are complex. Although the col-
lected input data and analysis processes may be very complex,
i.e. requiring a degree in medicine and/or statistics to under-
stand, the output data can be simple to understand. For exam-
ple, these data may simply be a list of providers with an indica-
tion of which providers are much better or worse than the
average provider for a given procedure. These data, although
perhaps not as useful as a detailed ranking of providers, are cer-
tainly not beyond the intelligence of the general public, and are
simpler than much of the other information the patient will
need to assess in making his or her medical decision.
Finally, withholding the data by the government from the
public because they are "too complex" would essentially rest on
paternalistic concerns about the population's inability to under-
202 For example, cardiac artery bypass grafting surgery, which provides about a 30%
mortality advantage if successfully performed, has an average mortality rate of approxi-
mately 5%. Thus, a person choosing to undergo surgery has, on average, a one in twenty
chance of dying, versus an uncertain future risk if no surgery is elected. Dr. Gerald T.
O'Connor, epidemiologist at the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, Address at the
Brooklyn Law School Symposium: Comparing Medical Providers, January 9, 1992 (on
file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
20 See supra notes 182-84.
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stand the data.0 4 However, access to government collected and
analyzed data "cannot be dependent upon [an administrator's]
assessment of the population's intelligence. 206 Indeed, the prov-
iders' argument runs against the notion that the public has a
fundamental right to receive information 20 6 in possession of the
government and should be "granted maximum access to the
records of [the] government. '207 In summary, the providers' first
argument that the government ought to withhold data from the
public because the data are too complex to comprehend or be-
cause the public is too ignorant to understand is weakened by
inherent flaws.
The providers' second argument in resisting disclosure is
that the statistics are inaccurate and therefore the statistics do
not sufficiently distinguish between poor quality care and the
naturally higher probability of poor outcomes associated with
more severe patient conditions. 20 8 Thus, some truly good provid-
ers who treat sicker patients are not correctly credited, resulting
in poorer rankings. 0 ' Truly good providers associated with poor
statistics may be unjustly damaged if that association harms
their reputation.210
Although some data analysis models may account for or
weigh risk factors better than others,211 no model can produce
perfectly accurate statistics regardless of the number of risk fac-
tors, type of risk factors or the risk factor/dependent variable
20, See Newsday, Inc. v. New York State Dep't of Health, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA)
1477 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1991).
205 Id.
20' See Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy a state statute making it "unprofessional
conduct" for a pharmacist to advertise prescription drug prices was invalidated. In
reaching its decision that "purely commercial" speech is entitled to First Amendment
protection, the Court also recognized a First Amendment right to receive information.
The state interest amounted to saying that consumers would be best protected if kept in
ignorance of the drug's prices. However, consumers had a compelling interest in the "free
flow of information"-who was charging how much for what drug. The Court concluded
that the First Amendment forbade the state from deciding that ignorance is preferable
to the free flow of truthful information and struck down the statute.
207 Newsday, 19 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1477 (quoting Matter of Capital Newspa-
pers, Div. of Hearst Corp. v. Whalen, 69 N.Y.2d 246, 252 (1987)).
208 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
209 Id.
210 Id.
211 See supra note 66. See also Open Heart Surger, supra note 41.
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modeling relationship used.212 Thus, the data will always indi-
cate that some providers are worse or better than they actually
are, and in this sense, will always be unfair, either to the physi-
cian or the consumer. But is there a superior alternative? The
haphazard qualitative methods now used by patients to select
providers are just as unfair to both physicians and patients.213
Even more so, why must data be put to a standard of
perfection until they can be disseminated and used when provid-
ers themselves are put to only a standard of reasonableness, i.e.
negligence, to prevent unfair harm to their patients.214 Data that
are released should be reasonably accurate, otherwise they are
no good to either the consumers or the providers, but they need
not be perfect.
Moreover, assuming one could know who the "truly good"
providers were, the frequency of misassociations that can cause
measurable, unrecoverable harm to them is bound to be very
low;2" 5 thus, measured on a societal basis, the overall cost of los-
ing an occasional provider will be low, especially in an area
where other providers are available to "pick up the slack"
caused by the loss. But one must recognize that a loss to the
individual doctor or hospital is enormous and thus the potential
for unfair harm must be minimized by the proper disclosure of
data.
212 See generally Pauly, supra note 173, at 35.
213 Community or professional reputation alone can also unfairly associate a truly
good or bad physician with a bad or good reputation. In fact, statistical data may help
correct this situation by providing evidence to the contrary. This once again leads to the
issue of not being able to determine who are the truly good or bad providers. If providers
claim that their reputations have been harmed by inaccurate data, then how does one
know (or prove), that their reputation was deserved in the first place? Data may be a
good place to start the evaluation.
214 See supra note 1.
215 For example, in the New York Study, 3 out of 30 hospitals were cited as high
outliers, i.e. their crude mortality rate (for cardiac artery bypass graft surgery) was much
higher than expected. Heart Surgery, supra note 79. Assume that of these three, one was
a "truly good" provider, i.e. misassociated. Further assume that one out of ten of these
misassociated were put out of business permanently due to license revocation (which
would probably only happen if other factors confirmed the statistics, indicating that the
provider was not "truly good"), or market forces (which also is unlikely since the associa-
tion would probably need to persist over a long period of time, again indicating that the
provider was not "truly good"). Thus, only 1 out of 300 has been unfairly damaged in
this hypothetical.
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b. Consumer Misreliance
Another potential cost is the possibility that consumers rely
upon these data which, because of inaccuracies, indicate that a
truly incompetent provider is better than he or she actually is.
This is the flipside of unjust reputational harm to providers
caused by inaccurate data and, like that problem, is occasionally
unfair and will never cease to exist. But this cost is not as severe
as unjust reputational harm for two reasons: (1) consumers Vll
often have other information to use in their decision making
that may alert the consumers to potential problems;10 and (2) if
they are indeed harmed by the provider, they may be able to sue
for medical malpractice. 17
3. Public Disclosure Should Be Mandated
The above comparison demonstrates that the benefits of
disclosure-increased patient autonomy through increased deci-
sion making ability, increased quality of health care through re-
duction of low-quality providers and reduction of health care
costs through increased competition-clearly outweigh the occa-
sional costs of unjust reputational harm and consumer misre-
liance. Thus, from a utilitarian approach,218 public disclosure of
provider-specific data collected by the government should be
mandated.
B. Limits on Data Disclosure
Although the providers' concerns of data complexity and in-
accuracy are not heavy enough to outweigh the arguments in
favor of mandatory public disclosure, their concerns do influence
the processes of collecting, analyzing and disclosing data. To
maximize the potential benefits and minimize the potential costs
216 Examples would be community or professional reputation, posible kmowledge of
disciplinary or malpractice actions involving the provider, as well as personal
observations.
" See supra note 1. Note that a provider is much less likely to be able to recover
for a harmed reputation by suing for defamation in the reverse situation, since the statis-
tics may be evidence that the provider was truly undeserving of the reputation he had,
and even if proved, the statistics may be used to mitigate damages.
218 This does not imply that a deontological approach does not support data disclos-
ure; the individual's right to make his or her own medical decisions is well-supported by
Kantian philosophy. Disclosing data to patients further shifts the decision-making power
from paternalistic physicians to patients.
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analyzed in the previous sections, disclosure should be subject to
various limits. It is both in the providers' and consumers' inter-
ests that data accuracy be maximized to mitigate the possibility
of harm to providers and to provide consumers with the best
information possible. Also, information needs to be conveyed
properly and in a timely manner to enhance data understand-
ability and usability.
1. When Not to Disclose Data
Two constraints should limit when data are disclosed. First,
statistics should not be disclosed for a specific provider until
enough input data has been collected about that provider to in-
sure a large enough sample size needed for statistical accu-
racy.219 Inaccurate statistics are less useful for the consumer and
may harm the provider. The second constraint is that the data
must be disclosed to consumers in a timely fashion-the data
must reflect a provider's recent performance so as to maximize
the effectiveness of patients' decision making.220
Meeting both constraints should not present a problem for a
provider who specializes in a certain procedure; a provider will
perform the procedure many times within a short time period.
However, if a provider only occasionally performs a procedure,
then the two constraints may conflict. By the time enough data
are collected to achieve the minimum data sample, the statistics
will be partially composed of old and probably stale data that do
not accurately reflect a provider's latest capabilities. For exam-
ple, a provider who has improved his performance within the
last quarter may be penalized by averaging in year-old data that
indicated poor performance, resulting in a lower (worse) ranking,
or vice-versa. One possible solution to this problem is to allow
for timely disclosure before achieving the minimum sample size,
but indicating to consumers that the data for this provider may
be less accurate than those providers who were able to meet the
minimum sample size. A more conservative solution may be to
219 The amount of procedures performed to guarantee statistical accuracy, see supra
note 73, will vary with what type of regression analysis is used, see supra note 66. For an
example of how many procedures were necessary to achieve statistical significance in the
cardiac artery bypass grafting analysis. See Open Heart Surgery, supra note 41.
220 For example, HFCA reports on a yearly basis. See supra note 9. New York re-
ports on a semi-annual basis. See Heart Surgery, supra note 79.
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report, without rankings or statistics, those providers unable to
meet the minimum caseload reporting requirement.2
21
2. What Data Should Be Disclosed and How
Generally, no input data should be disclosed to the public.
These data can be too difficult to understand and without the
proper analysis will not provide consumers with useful informa-
tion.222 Otherwise, the public should have access to all statistical
output data. These data may include crude, expected and risk-
adjusted rates, low and high outlier indications, ranked lists
based on the risk-adjusted rates and any other statistics that
may be useful in the decision-making process. In addition, some
simple input data-collection time interval, number of partici-
pating providers, number of cases-that establish bounds on the
analysis should be disclosed so that different sets of output data
may be compared.
Data presentation can take numerous forms. Individualized
rankings, ordered by risk-adjusted rates22 3 should be made avail-
221 But certain statistics may correlate highly to the number of procedures per-
formed. For example, coronary artery bypass grafting studies have shown that the corre-
lation between the volume of surgeries performed by a physician and his or her mortality
rate is high. See Edward Hannan et al, Investigation of the Relationship Between Vol-
ume and Mortality for Surgical Procedures Performed in New York State Hospital, 262
JAMA 503 (1989). Where this relationship has been shown, it may be worthwhile to
disclose the fact that a certain provider could not meet the minimum volumetric disclos-
ure requirement, even though the statistics computed for that provider are withheld. By
doing this, the provider will not be penalized by the disclosure of potentially inaccurate
statistics and the consumer will be warned that the provider is lacking some experience.
Hopefully this will offset the problem of young, inexperienced physicians being discour-
aged to practice because of fear of low initial rankings. At the same time, consumers will
be aware of physicians who perform certain procedures on only a casual basis and might
be a higher risk.
Generally, the risk data needed to generate highly accurate statistics, such as
those of the New York State Cardiac Surgery Reporting System, can be fairly complex.
If one has doubts, examine the listed clinical risk factors. See supra note 70. They in-
clude, for example, ejection fracture, preoperative intra-aortic balloon pump, unstable
angina and 90% narrowing of the main left trunk. It is reasonable to conclude that a
layperson, i.e. anyone without a medical degree, would have great difficulty in under-
standing what they.mean, and more importantly, how they contribute on a statistical
basis to mortality. However, it may not be out of the question to release raw data for
private sector analysis as long as agreements between the government collecting agency
and the private contractor can assure proper use and analysis of the data.
I The most important criteria for comparing providers are risk-adjusted rates, and
to a lesser extent, outlier data. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. Individu-
alized rankings must be based on risk-adjusted rates so physicians can be compared on
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able if the data's accuracy is high enough. For less accurate data,
rankings of groups of providers should be released.2 24 Binary
outlier data that indicate which providers are much better or
worse than expected should also be provided.225 Other data, such
an "apples to apples" basis, i.e., they all face the same preoperative mix of patient risk
factors. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. The most meaningful way to present
these rankings is by risk-adjusted rank order (see infra Appendix Table 1 and supra
note 79), presentation by alphabetical order (see infra Appendix Table 3 and supra note
79) or random order that makes comparison between providers much more difficult,
since the consumer must then sort the data into risk-adjusted rate order.
224 One may analogize this to law school grades. If one is highly confident that tests
accurately reflect ability, then the grading system should use number grades. This is
essentially equivalent to ranking providers on an individual basis. If one is less confident,
letter grades and plus/minus signs are preferable. This would be analogous to grouping
providers into approximately 10-13 groups. For each group, only the average risk-ad-
justed rate of that group would be used for all providers within the group. If one is even
less confident, then by letters alone. Now providers would be grouped in 5 larger groups.
Lastly, if one feels that tests indicate only those students whose performance is adequate
or inadequate, then a pass/fail (fail is equivalent to a "high outlier"--some grading sys-
tems have "high pass," which would be equivalent to a "low outlier") system should be
used. Thus all providers would be grouped into two groups with just a single risk-ad-
justed rate assigned to each group.
Thus as accuracy decreases, one is less and less confident that one provider should
be ranked above or below another, so that providers are ranked equally within a group.
As accuracy decreases further, the size of the groups increase to reflect the growing un-
certainty in the providers actual position within the standings, until one reaches only
two groups: those providers that are much worse than expected and all other providers.
If the risk-adjusted rates had infinite error, these two groups would collapse into one and
all providers would be deemed equally competent.
Of course, as one moves from individual rankings into groups and also as the num-
ber of groups decrease, information about a specific provider's performance decreases. By
the time two groups are reached, all one knows about a specific provider is whether that
provider is inadequate; the varying degrees of "adequate" performance have been lost. In
the extreme case of one group, one has lost all information, and the data are useless.
Thus, it is possible to have less than perfect data and still have useful information
passed onto patients and consumers. Obviously, one would like as accurate information
as possible so that the varying degrees of competency can be assessed.
222 For an explanation of binary outlier statistics, see supra notes 73-74. In essence,
they tell us those providers who perform much better or worse than the computed ex-
pected rate (above or below the upper of lower bounds set using a 95% confidence inter-
val). In presenting binary outlier data, one must decide whether to present with the risk-
adjusted rankings (by using markings in the ranking to indicate who the outliers are and
what types-good or bad) or in a separate listing.
The advantage of presenting them with the rankings is that all the information
needed to assist in decision making is within a single list. In addition, one may judge
easily if the outlier is "out of context" (e.g. a high (bad) outlier near the top of the
rankings, or the converse). The disadvantage is that it takes more effort by the consumer
to find who the outliers are, especially if the consumer must scan a list of 250 providers.
On the other hand, a separate list of outliers, probably only the high outliers, can
direct the consumer's immediate attention to those providers one might have to be care-
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as crude and expected rate data and upper and lower bounds on
the expected rates and number of cases, may also be presented
so long as they do not lead to confusion. 226 The method and
style of presentation should enhance consumer comprehension
and minimize possible data inaccuracies. 227
ful of. But this has the possibility of stigmatizing those providers. Recall that a 95%
confidence interval still allows for a 5% error-an average 1 out of 20 outliers has been
incorrectly deemed a high outlier.
The more conservative approach, and the approach that should be taken until all
the kinks have been worked out of these analysis systems, would be to list outliers as
part of the rankings. This should avoid the possible stigmatization problem. When analy-
ses are further refined and become accurate enough so that a 99.5% (three standard
deviations) confidence interval can be achieved, (thus lessening the error to three out of
a thousand), then separate high outlier lists should be presented.
26 For comparative purposes, it is not necessary to either the crude or expected rate
information to the general public. Crude rate data have not been risk-adjusted and
therefore may penalize those providers who do care for high-risk patients. The crude rate
is just another method of expressing two pieces of raw data-the number of incidents
divided by the number of cases-and raw data should not be generally disclosed. See
supra note 221. However, if they are disclosed, the discloser should provide an explana-
tion comparing risk-adjusted data and crude data to minimize confusion between the
two, and emphasize the use of risk-adjusted data for comparative purpose. Also, rank-
ings should not be done in order of crude rate-this again can cause confusion and make
the effort to compare via risk-adjusted rates more difficult since re-sorting must be done.
See supra note 222.
Even though provider crude rate data should not be disclosed, the overall crude
mortality rate, computed over all reporting providers, should be disclosed. This permits
the user to make a rough comparison of how well a provider is doing compared to the
overall average.
Although expected rate data are part of the process of generating both risk-adjusted
data and outlier data, they too are difficult to use for comparative purposes and are not
necessary for disclosure. The same caveats would apply to expected rate data as those
applied to crude rate data if expected rate data are useful for determining outlier data,
but are not needed to compare providers.
The number of cases is one of the few raw data elements that should be disclosed. In
certain cases this data may correlate to quality, Le. practice makes perfect. See supra
note 221. If this happens to be true, this correlation should be disclosed. The number of
cases also tells the consumer the relative utilization between different methods of treat-
ment for the same ailment by a certain provider. For example, it may tell the patient
whether a physician tends to do more C-sections than other phsicians for child birth. It
does not indicate, however, if any one of those treatments is overutilized or underutil-
ized-it is possible that the relative number of treatments were appropriate.
A separate list of providers who have not met the minimum volumetric disclosure
requirement should be included separately. See supra note 221. Also a list of those prov-
iders exempt from disclosure requirement should also be listed. See infra note 228 and
accompanying text. The discloser may also present an indication whether the physician
is higher or lower in the rankings from the last reporting interval, or provide an average
ranking computed over a few reporting periods. This allows the provider's performance
to be tracked over time.
For samples of how data have been presented, see infra Appendix Tables 2 and
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3. Exemptions for Providers from Data Collection or Data
Disclosure
The only exemptions from reporting to data collection agen-
cies would be to those providers that would suffer a prohibitively
large financial burden were they to comply with data reporting
requirements.22 s Otherwise, all providers would be required to
report data to data collecting agencies, even if they are ulti-
mately exempt from future government disclosure of statistics
derived from their reported data.229
Disclosure exemptions may be offered to certain providers.
Examples would be to rural providers, specialty health care fa-
cilities and hospitals with less than a minimum number of beds.
These exemptions fit within the framework of consumer/patient
and provider interests. Both rural providers and specialty hospi-
tals are generally not selected on a comparative basis, thus pro-
3. When the New York State Department of Health released these statistics, they were
accompanied by a news release summarizing the key features of the data, the intent of
disclosure, how data are to be used and by whom, and a list of typical questions that the
data may raise with replies.
The techniques of what data to disclose and how to disclose that data should help
minimize the effects of data inaccuracy. See supra notes 220-25 and accompanying text.
In summary, generally only risk-adjusted data, outlier data, and volume data should be
disclosed. The rankings should be a function of the risk-adjusted data only. Providers
should be listed either individually or in groups as a function of the risk-adjusted data
accuracy; as the accuracy decreases, fewer groups with more providers in each group.
Those providers who are outliers should be marked as such within the rankings and as
the reliability of data increases, separate lists of outliers should be presented. The num-
ber of cases should be presented for each provider. Any other data included should be
carefully explained to avoid potential confusion.
The data must be presented in a form that emphasizes the relative importance of
the data. For example, the risk-adjusted data should be in bold type and outliers in
upper case letters. If the data are physician-specific, then the affiliated hospital and loca-
tion of that hospital should be listed along with the physician's name. Thus, all that is
needed for an easy and speedy comparison of providers is conspicuously presented.
What caveats, qualifications, disclaimers and other explanatory information should
surround the data? First and foremost this data should be used in conjunction with
other qualitative information available-this should reduce the chances of making an
error in selection. Patients should be reminded to discuss the data with the provider. A
list of questions and answers, similar to that done by the New York State Department of
Health, is a good idea-it should help reduce confusion on what the data are and how to
use them. Any provider comments on the collection and analysis of this data should be
released along with them. See supra note 230 and accompanying text.
22S This may be cured by subsidizing those providers.
29 Data can still be used by government officials for quality control and utilization
purposes and thus should still be reported, even if exempted from future public disclos-
ure of statistics computed from the collected data.
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viding information for decision making purposes is not neces-
sary, nor would costs be reduced through competition since no
competition exists. 230  Furthermore, they may not produce
enough data for accurate statistics.
4. Predisclosure Provider Review
Statistics should be given to providers for review before dis-
semination to the general public. 23' Responses by providers
should be made available to the public along with the data. This
opportunity for review must have a quick turnaround time to
insure that data are in the hands of the public in a timely
manner.
C. How Current Data System Regulations Fail to Protect Pa-
tients' and Providers' Interests
The data collection and analysis systems maintained by fed-
eral and state governments either fail to disclose data to the
public, or fail to present the data properly.23 2 Thus, patient au-
230 Some states, for example, are exempt from reporting those hospitals with less
than 50 beds, psychiatric hospitals, military hospitals, VA hospitals, crippled or mentally
retarded care facilities. For specific statutes, see supra note 149. Instead, these hospitals
should be required to report, see supra note 228, but nonetheless be given exemptions
from having their statistics disclosed.
231 In Iowa and Colorado, for example, the health-data agencies shared the statistics
exclusively with the hospitals for the first 18 months of collecting and analyzing data
without disclosing the statistics to the public. This gave the hospitals a chance to im-
prove their quality before the first disclosure of the next 18 month's worth of data. See
David Zinman, Gauging The Quality of Health Care, NEwSaAy, Jan. 21, 1992, at 55
[hereinafter Gauging Health Care]. This approach of having a dry run before starting
the system is a good idea. The data agencies can work the bugs out of their systems and
solicit feedback from the providers concerning the collection and analysis techniques. It
also gives the hospitals a chance to improve their procedures and identify poor perform-
ing physicians out of the public eye before initial public disclosure-essentially a last
chance to get their house in order.
After the data agencies start disclosing data to the public on a regular basis, statis-
tici should be given to providers a short time before public dissemination so that they
may check for and correct any large errors, as well as submit possible explanations for
their performance and corrective measures already taken. This can help soften the po-
tentially negative impact of less than desirable rankings.
22 The federal government, specifically HCFA, has failed to disclose physician-spe-
cific data publicly, thus leaving a FOIA challenge as the only means to gain access to this
data. See supra notes 95-141 and accompanying text. HCFA does partially disclose data,
see supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. But the quality may be lacking. See infra
notes 235-38 and accompanying text.
Most states do not permit disclosure, see supra notes 152-53, which leaves a state
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tonomy is not maximized and the potential harm to providers
and consumers is not minimized. But some data systems are
moving in the right direction.1 3 HCFA's Medicare Statistical
System and New York's Cardiac Surgery Reporting System
("CSRS") illustrate the strengths and shortcomings of the na-
tion's leading provider-specific quality-of-care systems. Overall,
these two systems reflect the current general lack of protection
given to both patients' and providers' interests; but they are
both bent on improvement.
HCFA publicly discloses hospital-specific data on a yearly
basis.234 The data provide an indication of quality-of-care for
Medicare health care facilities for both consumer and hospital
use.2 35 While the first release of HCFA data was a large step in
the direction of patient autonomy, HCFA's system has many
shortcomings.
HCFA does not voluntarily disclose physician-specific data
to the general public, even though FOIA challenges to obtain
this information will likely be successful. 36 HCFA fails to collect
detailed clinical patient risk data. 37 Thus, HCFA's output is not
as accurate as it can be. HCFA's data are collected on Medicare
patients only.2 38 Statistical data derived from the generally older
and more sickly patient population that Medicare serves may
not be indicative of care for the general population.3 In gen-
eral, HCFA needs to upgrade and expand its data collection and
analysis efforts to produce higher quality results, and also volun-
tarily disclose physician-specific data.
freedom of information law challenge as the only option, see supra note 155, assuming
the state has not exempted the data from that law. For states that do disclose, see supra
note 154, the accuracy, presentation, and timeliness of information can be improved, as
discussed in the text. See infra notes 239-54 and accompanying text.
233 In addition to HCFA and New York's CSRS, Pennsylvania, Iowa and Colorado
are considered to be at the forefront of data collection. See Gauging Health Care, supra
note 231, at 54-55.
23, See supra note 9.
235 See supra note 42.
238 See supra notes 95-141 and accompanying text.
227 See supra note 50.
238 See supra note 42.
'39 Even though statistics are adjusted by age and other risk factors (to account for
"older, sicker" patients), the results may not shed meaningful light on procedures that
are not common to older, sicker patients. Also, older patients tend to have more unac-
counted for risk factors (i.e. those due to comorbidities), which makes the statistics less
accurate. See supra note 66.
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New York's unique CSRS leads the nation in the quality of
statistics produced by collecting both demographic, diagnostic
and detailed patient-specific clinical risk factors.20 The data's
accuracy is considered high, despite criticisms that the analysis
model may be flawed and not all risk factors are collected. 41 Un-
fortunately, statistics are only generated for a single procedure:
cardiac artery bypass grafting surgery. But New York may ex-
pand its system to include other procedures.242
New York's Department of Health releases detailed statis-
tics, including specific good and bad outliers, for all New York
hospitals that perform open heart surgery in rank order.24 3
While it did not voluntarily disclose similar cardiac surgeon
rankings to the public, instead providing only hospitals with the
information,2 " a New York State supreme court has recently or-
dered these data to be disclosed to a New York newspaper under
New York's Freedom of Information Law.240 Thus, for a single
procedure-open heart surgery-New York has protected both
patients' and providers' interests in provider-specific data dis-
closure to a great extent. New York health care consumers now
have access to detailed risk information and physician and hos-
pital rankings.
Proper data presentation is critical to successfully using the
disclosed information; the following is a critique of how New
York has decided to present its provider-specific data. New York
State presented statistics in order of risk-adjusted mortality
rates in its initial disclosure of hospital-specific data covering
the January-June 1989 and 1990 time periods .24 This is correct,
since it presents data to the public by the statistic that counts
most: how well the provider performed discounted by pre-opera-
tive patient risk-factors, thus allowing providers to be ranked.4 7
Unfortunately, the next disclosure of data took a large step
backwards and listed the data in alphabetical order instead.24a
240 See supra note 70.
I" See supra notes 24-27.
242 See supra note 58.
242 See Cardiac Surgery, supra note 79; Heart Surgery, supra note 79.
244 See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
245 See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
246 See Cardiac Surgery, supra note 79. The January to June 1989 statistics are at
Appendix Table 2.
7 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
24s See Heart Surgery, supra note 79. The July-December 1990 statistics are at Ap-
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Similarly, the initial release of physician-specific data was listed
in the order of decreasing caseload instead of risk-adjusted rate;
since volume highly correlates to risk-adjusted rate for this pro-
cedure,24 9 it is not as misleading as alphabetical order, but it still
makes comparison rather difficult. Thus, unless the consumer
was willing to sort the statistics by risk-adjusted rates them-
selves, comparisons are difficult to make and time-consuming for
the latest New York data.
Outlier data were not provided in the initial set of hospital-
specific data or physician-specific data;2 50 although not abso-
lutely necessary for comparison, outlier data are useful.2 1 How-
ever, outlier data were added to the next release of hospital-spe-
cific data.26 2
In the initial release of New York statistics, caseload, num-
ber of deaths, crude mortality rate data and the statewide crude
mortality rate were also presented.253 The additional provider-
specific crude rates do not provide additional information to the
consumer, and since they may lead to confusion with the risk-
adjusted rates, they should not be presented.5 4 In fact, the lat-
est hospital and physician-specific data no longer include the
crude mortality rate.2 5
In summary, these two leading systems are beginning to ac-
commodate both patient/consumer and physician interests. Hos-
pital-specific data have been made publicly available by both
HCFA and New York State, and physician-specific data are now
publicly available for New York cardiac surgeons. Raw data are
being adjusted for severity of illness and other risk factors, even
though improvements are needed in HCFA's system to improve
their accuracy. New York has accurate data, but they are limited
to only one procedure. New York's presentation is a mixed bag.
On the positive side, New York has removed crude rate data
from the statistics and has added outlier data to the latest hos-
pital-specific data; on the negative side, New York has stopped
pendix Table 3. See supra note 222.
249 See supra notes 220-22.
220 See supra note 244.
See supra notes 224, 226.
292 See supra note 246.
See supra note 243.
254 See supra notes 225.
"I See supra note 226 and accompanying text.
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providing statistics ranked in risk-adjusted rate order and does
not provide physician-specific outlier data. Regardless, the sta-
tistics are generally understandable to consumers, but much
room for improvement exists.
D. Proposed Law of Mandatory Limited Data Disclosure and
its Potential Legal and Non-legal Ramifications
1. Proposed Law of Mandatory Limited Data Disclosure
This Note proposes that public disclosure of government
collected and analyzed data should be mandatory to enhance the
prevailing patient/consumer interests as discussed in Part HI-A
and to remove the need to make freedom of information re-
quests to gain access to nondisclosed data as discussed in Part
II. To maximize the benefits and, more importantly, minimize
the costs associated with mandatory disclosure, the disclosure
should be limited by some or all of the constraints suggested in
Part Ill-B. There are, however, other legal and nonlegal ramifi-
cations of mandatory disclosure. A brief examination of these
ramifications follows.
2. Legal Ramifications
a. Informed Consent
Providers would likely have to disclose the statistics to their
patients to satisfy the requirements of informed consent.250 To
meet these requirements the data must satisfy either a reasona-
ble patient's (materiality) standard or reasonable physician's
(professional) standard, depending upon a state's informed con-
sent law.251 7 Although there is no case law on this subject of dis-
closing provider-specific statistics, it would be difficult to refute
that data disclosure should be required under the materiality
standard of informed consent because this information provides
"the probability of success [of the proposed treatment] of alter-
natives"258 and "due care normally requires that the physician
See supra note 1.
" For example, New York's informed consent cause of action require3 that the doc-
tor disclose "the reasonably foreseeable risks" so that the patient may make a "knowl-
edgeable evaluation." N.Y. Pun. HEALTH § 2805-d (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1992).
258 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960). Natanson was the second
major case establishing the informed consent cause of action, succeeding Salgo v. Leland
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warn the patient of any risk to his well-being which the contem-
plated therapy might involve."2 59 Although these tests tradition-
ally applied to general risk data for the proposed treatment,210
they can be extended to provider-specific risk information if one
views the treatment as not just the procedure itself, but instead
as the procedure as performed by a specific provider. Thus, if a
patient is given the provider-specific statistics and/or the rank-
ing of his or her provider, the patient now has the "probability
of success" of the proposed "treatment." In addition, one may
view from this perspective the statistics and/or rankings of the
other physicians as "alternate" treatments.
Informed consent disclosure may be more difficult to
achieve under a professional standard. Under this standard, a
physician would only have to disclose information that "a rea-
sonable and prudent medical doctor of the same school of prac-
tice [as the physician] under similar circumstances. '"261 Even
under a materiality standard there are special situations when a
physician may not disclose-" [w]hen medical judgment enters
the picture and for that reason special standard controls, pre-
vailing medical practice must be given its just due."262 This is a
"hybrid" standard of care combining elements of autonomous
decision making embedded in the materiality standard with the
discretionary elements of the professional standard. But the
physician's traditional reasons of withholding risk data from pa-
Stanford Jr. University Board of Trustees, 317 P.2d 170 (Cal. 1957) which initially estab-
lished the absolute duty that physicians, within their discretion, disclose the risks of the
proposed treatment so that a patient may intelligently consent. Natanson stepped away
from the absolute duty to disclose and instead framed the duty in terms of negligence by
implementing the reasonable doctor standard, and requiring that the physician's failure
to disclose was the proximate cause of the injury. Natanson v. Kline, 354 P.2d 670 (Kan.
1960). One of these duties was "to disclose and explain... the probability of success [of
the proposed treatment) or of alternatives" mentioned in the test. Id. at 673.
259 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1971). Canterbury was the
third major case establishing the informed consent cause of action. It established a stan-
dard of disclosure set by law rather than self-imposed by physicians. Id. at 784. This
standard was essentially a reasonable patient standard-all material risks must be dis-
closed, and "a risk is thus material when a reasonable person, in what the physician
knows or should know to be the patient's position, would be likely to attach significance
to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding whether or not to forego the proposed therapy."
Id. at 787, citing Waltz & Scheuneman, Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 Nw. U. L. REv.
628, 640 (1970).
260 See supra note 4.
261 Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1107 (Kan. 1960).
262 Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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tients under the professional standard or hybrid stan-
dard-disclosure of general risk information may deter a patient
from undergoing needed surgery, or might produce adverse psy-
chological reactions that may preclude the success of the treat-
ment2 6 3-do not apply when disclosure of provider-specific data
are in question. Disclosure of provider-specific data should not
deter a patient from undergoing treatment any more than gen-
eral risk data; it will just deter a patient from having the treat-
ment performed by one provider instead of another. Also, the
disclosure of a provider's performance will have much less im-
pact on a patient's psychological condition than general risk
data since these data count for a much smaller percentage of the
risk in undergoing treatment.6 4 Thus, it seems that disclosure
would be required even under a professional or hybrid disclosure
standard.
How may the proposed mandatory disclosure by the govern-
ment of this information to the public affect informed consent
disclosure requirements? Government disclosure will give weight
to the importance of this information, thus reinforcing the ne-
cessity of provider disclosure to patients, especially in those
states employing a professional standard of care. However, pub-
lic disclosure of provider-specific data might instead fulfill the
provider's obligation to warn, if one assumes that the patient al-
ready has this information before treatment, thus potentially
eliminating claims of lack of informed consent against providers
for failure to provide their statistics or rankings.
b. Medical Malpractice
Use of provider-specific data may have the greatest impact
in the legal world in medical malpractice cases. Although the
failure to obtain a patient's informed consent may theoretically
allow a patient to bring a cause of action against a provider,
these actions are rarely won unless there is also evidence of med-
ical malpractice.26 5 Thus the failure of a provider to disclose this
263 Id. at 778.
24 See supra note 4.
"Juries rarely, if ever, bring in a verdict solely on informed consent. They want
to know if the doctor did harm." David Zinman, Need NY Heart Surgeons Reveal Rank-
ing, NEWSDAY, Jan. 21, 1992, at 55 (quoting Paul D. Rheingold, a leading plaintiffa attor-
ney in products liability, medical malpractice and drug-related litigation). For problems
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information to the patient if required,66 more specifically, the
failure to provide statistics indicating that the physician was
worse than average, and thus did not obtain informed consent,
may be used best to create a background suggesting a lack of
due care in a medical malpractice action.
Provider-specific quality-of-care data may also be directly
used, if admissible,26 7 as evidence of medical malpractice. In one
respect, the data may provide evidence of breach of the profes-
sional standard of care: the plaintiff patient will use the data to
in-informed consent litigation, see supra note 1. See also Rheingold, supra note 30, at
75
286 See supra notes 256-64 and accompanying text.
267 Admissibility will be a large hurdle to overcome in the use of provider-specific
quality-of-care data as evidence of breach of due care in a medical malpractice action.
Under Federal Rules of Evidence ("FRE") Rule 402, "[a]ll relevant evidence is admissi-
ble," where relevance is defined by FRE Rule 401 as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EViD. 402,
401. FRE 403 will exclude relevant evidence if "its probative value is substantially out-
weighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumula-
tive evidence." FED. R. EvD. 403.
Thus FRE 401 may allow provider-specific quality-of-care statistics in as evidence of
similar conduct, unless, by FRE 403, its probative value is outweighed by the enumer-
ated exclusionary factors. There is no case law on point; the most analogous case is Ev-
ans v. Dugger, 908 F.2d 801 (11th Cir. 1990). In Evans a prisoner, claiming violation of
his civil rights because of the prison's deliberate indifference to his serious medical
needs, sought admission of statistical reports reciting seventeen years of generally bad
care to other patients in the prison system. The court allowed redacted versions of the
reports, removing those portions "which were neither unduly prejudicial, confusing, mis-
leading or cumulative." Id. at 809.
It is a general rule in negligence cases in New York, a common law state, that evi-
dence of prior similar acts or habit demonstrating defendant's lack of care is inadmissi-
ble to raise an inference that the defendant exercised the same lack of care in the case at
hand. See JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE §§ 184, 186 (10th ed. 1973). Thus,
where this is the rule, use of provider-specific statistics indicating poor quality care in
the past will not be admissible to show that the defendant failed to use due care in the
current case. See Johnson v. Myers, 165 S.E.2d 739, 742 (Ga. 1968) (plaintiff's evidence
attempting to prove that the defendant physician had performed unnecessary surgery on
him by showing that the physician performed unnecessary surgeries in the past was held
inadmissible).
It is possible that the statistics showing a physician to be a low-quality performer
may be used against a hospital since they demonstrate that the hospital was on notice,
and thus may be negligent in either its credentialing or supervision of the physician.
This view was taken by both Paul Rheingold, supra note 30, and Sheila L. Birnbaum (a
leading defense attorney in products liability and medical malpractice litigation). Ad-
dresses given at the Brooklyn Law School Symposium: Comparing Medical Providers,
January 9, 1992 (on file with the Brooklyn Law Review).
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show the defendant physician is at fault. For example, if a phy-
sician performs a certain treatment in the face of statistics that
indicate that for this procedure the doctor has been a low-qual-
ity, worse-than-average performer, then this fact may be circum-
stantial evidence of negligence. On the other hand, a physician
may use the data to indicate that he or she has been careful in
the past and thus was careful in the case at hand. Both of these
possibilities present the problem of how much worse or better
than average the physician must be before the data can be used
as evidence of fault or care respectively. It is possible only physi-
cians who are outliers may fall within this category of evi-
dence. 28 Public knowledge of provider-specific data might also
give rise to either contributory negligence (or contributive fault
in comparative liability states) or assumption of risk defenses
for physicians.2 16  A physician may argue "that a patient who has
voluntarily consented to be treated for a given procedure by a
known low-quality physician has "assumed the risk" of any con-
sequences that may follow, or that the patient is partially to
blame for choosing a low-quality physician.
These data would probably not be used to prove causation
since prior similar conduct does not indicate whether damages in
the present case were the proximate result of the defendant phy-
sician's breach of due care. But these data may be used as evi-
dence of proportional causation in those courts that allow recov-
ery for it;27° the data may show that a low-quality physician
268 See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text for an explanation of outliers.
289 Contributory negligence is conduct on the part of plaintiff that falls below the
standard of due care and is a legally contributing cause to plaintiffs injuries. See KEE-
TON ET AL, supra note 1, § 65, at 451. At common law this was a complete bar to recov-
ery, however, most states have now adopted comparative negligence to overcome the
harshness of this rule. In comparative negligence, fault is allocated between plaintiff and
defendant, resulting in plaintiff's recovery reduced by the proportional amount of plain-
tiff's fault. Id., § 67, at 468-72. In an assumption of the risk defense, the defendant af-
firmatively claims that plaintiff had knowledge of a condition or situation obviously dan-
gerous to herself and yet voluntarily exposed herself to the hazard so as to relieve
defendant of any legal liability for any resulting injury. Id., § 68, at 480-81.
270 See Hershkovitz v. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474 (Or.
1983) (medical malpractice was the "but for" cause for significantly reducing a patient's
chance of survival from 39% to 25%; although defendant's negligent act would not be a
cause of death, since the plaintiff probably would have died anyway, recovery was al-
lowed for reducing the plaintiff's chance of survival). Of course, numerical estimates of
risk, such as provider-specific quality-of-care data, are needed for this type of recovery.
"As expert opinion evidence quantifying risk becomes more readily available, advocates
will present more issues in these areas for resolution by courts and legislature." KEnroN
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performing a certain treatment has statistically increased the
risk of patient harm. In addition, introduction of such data as
evidence may create an atmosphere for punitive damages, which
are generally rare in medical malpractice cases, 27 1 since they may
indicate statistically a gross deviation from the standard of care.
3. Nonlegal Ramifications
a. Physician-Patient Relationship
It is very likely that public knowledge of provider-specific
quality-of-care data will further shift the decision-making power
in the physician-patient relationship toward patients. That in-
crease in power, however, will require an increase in responsible
use of that data by patients to prevent both harm to themselves
and their physicians. The physician-patient relationship has
evolved dramatically over the last few decades. For many years,
the patient was involved in only one key decision; placing him-
self or herself in the doctor's care. All subsequent power was del-
egated to the doctor. This relationship assumed that the patient
lacked the ability to make medical decisions, justifying the phy-
sician's role of making decisions on behalf of the patient. 272
In this model, disclosure of risk information to the patient
was only done for therapeutic purposes. But in recent decades
new developments have increased the patient's role to more than
pro forma respect. New technology and treatments have ex-
panded the patient's options. Conflict within the medical com-
munity is widely publicized; perhaps your doctor does not know
what is best for you. Increased knowledge of medicine has accen-
ET AL., supra note 1, § 41, at 272.
271 Punitive damages would most likely be assessed in cases involving battery, e.g., a
treatment performed without the patient's consent. See supra note 1. But negligence, i.e.
medical malpractice, has generally displaced battery as the basis of liability. Generally,
more than the mere commission of a negligent tort is required for punitive damages;
circumstances must involve "wilful or wanton" conduct. Thus, the deviation from the
standard of care must be "gross" in order to justify the awarding of punitive damages.
KEErON ET AL., supra note 1, § 2, at 9-10. Introduction of statistics indicating that the
performance of a physician has been far below average in the past, when combined with
evidence of misconduct in the case at hand, may be enough for a jury to conclude that
the performer has been grossly negligent and therefore deserving of monetary punish-
ment. Without the evidence of poor past performance, the jury may instead conclude
that the physician's misconduct in the case at hand was only a solitary incident and be
thus more forgiving.
272 See Schultz, supra note 1, at 221.
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tuated how much remains unknown.7 3 Only by comparing alter-
natives based on some numerical formulation of risks can a final
decision be made as to whether to undergo treatment and who
should perform that treatment.
The question then becomes who should decide given the
many risk-valued alternatives. The paternalism of physicians
still exists today, but the notion that the mere hiring of a physi-
cian transfers all decision-making authority to him or her has
been legally repudiated by the doctrine of informed consent.2
Disclosing physician-specific quality-of-care data to patients
will, for the first time, allow them to choose among providers for
a given procedure competently, without the paternalistic influ-
ence and bias of providers since providers have been indepen-
dently assessed on a comparable numerical basis. However, this
does not imply that a decision should be made without consult-
ing a physician and using other ancillary qualitative information
the patient may already possess; this could lead both to pa-
tient27 5 and physician harm2' 1 since the information is not per-
fect. Thus, this increase in patient decision-making power comes
with the added responsibility of using the data wisely and recog-
nizing the limitations inherent in this new form of risk data.
b. Defensive Medicine
Some providers who do not trust the system's ability to gen-
erate accurate data may be reluctant to treat high-risk patients;
if the risk-adjustment analysis does not give enough credit for
treating high-risk patients, then failure to successfully treat
these patients may lead to statistics indicating poor care even
after risk-adjustment. Recently cardiac surgeons in New York
have stated that they "began sensing a trend away from high
risk cases two years after the state published a risk-adjusted
ranking of surgeons doing coronary bypass operations.2 77 One
low-ranked New York hospital has publicly announced that it
27 Id. at 221-22.
=4 Id. at 222-23.
275 See supra notes 215-17 and accompanying text.
2 See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
277 David Zinman, Hearts in Need, NEWSDAY, May 11, 1992, at 7. However, there is
no hard data on whether surgeons and hospitals are actually refusing to take patients for
fear of increasing their chances of reducing their ranking in state mortality statistics;
most of the evidence is anecdotal. Id.
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will no longer treat high-risk cardiac patients.178 Of course, re-
luctance to treat high-risk patients is not necessarily bad; in
some cases a low-quality provider should be encouraged to refer
these patients to a better qualified provider. 7 But when a high-
risk patient cannot find any doctor for treatment, or must travel
a long distance to obtain care, a problem exists.28
Ideally risk-adjustment should compensate a provider for
the treatment of high-risk patients s.2 8  However, statistics may
be skewed against high-risk patients either intentionally,8 2 or by
the failure to account for significant risk factors in the regression
analysis s.28  As stated previously, statistics are not perfect. But
even if they were extremely accurate, both hospitals and physi-
cians would naturally tend to shy away from high-risk pa-
tients-"better safe than sorry."
How can this trend be reversed? Although educating prov-
iders on the accuracy of analysis techniques might persuade
them to take high-risk patients, the impact would probably be
marginal; well-educated physicians already "know the score."
State Health Department investigations into this possibly un-
ethical behavior-providers' putting their own interests in good
statistics over patients' interests in receiving adequate
care-would not succeed. A provider can always claim that it
was not in a patient's best interest to undergo treatment with
that provider, or at all.284
278 Id. at 18 (North Shore University Hospital did not operate on 23 high-risk pa-
tients as part of a concerted effort to reduce its mortality ranking).
279 "And in some cases, it may be better for surgeons to refer high-risk patients to
doctors who have proven their skills in difficult cases. In fact, advocates of the ranking
system say it is supposed to encourage such referrals as a way of improving patient
care." Id. at 7. See also supra note 20 (St. Vincent's hospital improvement in perform-
ance was in part due to state-approved referrals of high-risk patients).
280 "'The deep issue is that if you are a high-risk patient and you are not near an
institution willing to do high-risk cases, you may not have equal access to health care.'"
Zinman, supra note 277, at 18 (quoting cardiologist Dr. Alan Hartman).
281 See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
282 It has been alleged by critics of New York's CSRS that "[risk-adjusted] method-
ology is tilted against such high-risk patients because the state wants to cut back on
soaring health costs by discouraging bypasses, which can cost $50,000." Zinman, supra
note 277, at 7.
82 See supra note 66.
84 In addition to referrals, a physician may claim that the treatment simply should
not be performed since the benefits may be only marginal. "'There is plenty of experi-
ence to show some operations should not be done. You can end up extending enormous
resources to patients whose situations are beyond hope. They can have a dismal lifestyle
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Instead proper incentives must be given for a provider to
take high-risk cases. Monetary incentives could be used to com-
pensate providers for any loss in revenue from the perceived or
actual reduction in performance rating. 5 However, Medicare
and other third-party payers currently pay a fixed fee for a given
procedure regardless of risk.2 86 Thus, not only are high-risk pa-
tients unattractive because of the possible or imagined effects on
statistics, but also because they require extra, more expensive
care and are thus financially unrewarding. 281 Another incentive
might be to give providers "bonus points," i.e. extra credit above
the credit given by the risk-adjustment analysis, for treating
high-risk patients to compensate for any unknown biases and er-
rors in the analysis. Thus a provider may boost his or her rank-
ing by taking on and successfully treating high-risk patients.
This, however, creates a perverse incentive for low-quality prov-
iders to take on high-risk patients that possibly should be re-
ferred to high-quality providers instead.
In summary, providers' refusal to treat high-risk patients in
fear of lower performance statistics is a side effect of mandatory
disclosure that must be corrected to insure that these patients
receive treatment. Monetary or statistical incentives may be the
only way to reverse this trend since provider education and
health department investigations will probably be ineffective.
c. Reduction in Providers
The reduction of low-quality providers may be another ef-
fect of mandatory disclosure; this is not necessarily bad since the
overall quality of care should increase. This may also reduce the
amount of medical malpractice litigation since the number of
adverse incidents against patients should decrease. However,
this reduction may not be good if these marginal providers pro-
vide, even at low quality, the substantial portion of health care
in, for example, a rural community or an urban low-income com-
munity. Exempting these providers from disclosure, as discussed
for two to six months and then die anyway."' Zinman, supra note 277, at 7 (quoting
cardiologist Dr. Gregory Gustafson).
' Loss in revenue may be the result of the decrease in patients coming into the
hospital or from a reduction in hospital donations. See id. at 18.
11 See id. at 7.
287 Id.
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in Part III-B, may solve this problem.288 Also, new physicians
may be discouraged from entering medicine or a specialty for
fear of being ranked. They too may be exempted from disclosure
until they have an opportunity to gain sufficient experience, as
discussed in Part III-B. Thus it appears that unwanted reduc-
tion in providers or discouragement from entering the profession
may be ameliorated by providing for disclosure exemptions and
thus should not be a major source of concern.
CONCLUSION
As the debate over whether to disclose provider-specific
quality-of-care data continues between providers and consumer
advocates, the slow trickle of provider-specific quality-of-care
data currently being disclosed by government agencies may soon
rage into a flood. Current laws governing disclosure do not ade-
quately protect both patients' and providers' interests. They ei-
ther fail to disclose some or all of the data, leaving open as the
only avenue of disclosure, if not otherwise prohibited, litigious
freedom of information requests. Current disclosure laws also do
not impose proper limitations on who should be exempt from
either reporting or disclosure, what may be disclosed and when,
and how the data should be disclosed. This Note concludes that
disclosure of this new form of decision-making data by all gov-
ernment collection agencies must be mandatory to protect effec-
tively and enhance the important interest of patient autonomy
in medical decision making, to increase overall provider quality
and to promote competition among providers with the goal of
reducing staggering health care costs. This Note also concludes
that this disclosure should be limited, as suggested in Part III-B,
to minimize the potential harm to providers and diminish some
of the various undesirable legal and nonlegal side effects arising
from mandatory disclosure.
Douglas Sharrott
.8 See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
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APPENDIX TABLE 1
CRUDE AND EXPECTED IN-HOSPITAL MORTALITY RATES
FOR HOSPITALS PROVIDING OPEN HEART SURGERY
(in Order of Increasing Crude Mortality Rate)*
95% Confidence
Interval for
Expected Rate, %
Crude Expected
No. of Mortality Mortality Lower Upper
Hospital Patients Rate, % Rate, % Bound Bound
1 404 2.2 3.9 2.0 7.4
2 580 2.9 3.8 2.0 7.4
3 152 3.3t 6.9 4.7 9.9
4 322 3.4t 7.2 5.1 10.2
5 83 3.6 3.6 1.8 7.2
6 410 3.7 4.2 2.3 7.6
7 243 3.7 2.8 1.1 6.8
8 259 3.9t 6.9 4.7 9.9
9 163 4.3 6.1 4.0 9.2
10 675 4.3 5.0 3.0 8.2
11 495 4.4 5.0 3.0 8.2
12 509 4.5 5.6 3.5 8.8
13 130 4.6 4.6 2.7 7.9
14 387 4.7 3.3 1.5 7.1
15 230 4.8 4.5 2.6 7.9
16 237 5.1 4.0 2.1 7.5
17 262 5.3 4.4 2.4 7.7
18 193 5.7 4.5 2.5 7.8
19 475 6.1 5.5 3.5 8.7
20 254 6.3 5.6 3.5 8.8
21 251 6.8 3.4 1.6 7.1
22 191 7.3tt 3.6 1.7 7.2
23 54 7.4 6.9 4.8 9.9
24 134 7.5 6.9 4.8 9.9
25 144 7.6ff 3.9 2.0 7.4
26 104 8.7 9.3 7.1 12.2
27 192 9.9tt 6.0 3.9 9.1
28 63 14.3tt 3.9 2.0 7.4
*Statewide crude mortality rate = 4.87%
"Crude mortality rate significantly higher than expected (a .05)
ttCrude mortality rate significantly lower than expected (a = .05)
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APPENDIX TABLE 2
CRUDE AND RISK-ADJUSTED MORTALITY
RATES FOR HOSPITALS PERFORMING ADULT CARDIAC SURGERY
IN NEW YORK STATE, DISCHARGE JANUARY-JUNE 1989
Hospital
1 Mount Sinai Hospital
2 Lenox Hill Hospital
3 Presbyterian Hospital-City of New
York
4 Westchester County Medical Center
5 Long Island Jewish Medical Center
6 Buffalo General Hospital
7 New York University Medical Center
8 St Francis Hospital
9 Albany Medical Center Hospital
10 New York Hospital
11 University Hospital (Stony Brook)
12 State University Hosp Upstate Med
Center
13 Binghamton General Hospital Division
14 North Shore University Hospital
15 Bellevue Hospital Center
16 Montefiore Medical Center-Weiler
Hospital
17 Rochester General Hospital
18 Maimonides Medical Center
19 Strong Memorial Hospital
20 Millard Fillmore Hospital
21 Montefiore Medical Center-Moses
Division
22 St Josephs Hospital Health Center
23 St Lukes-St Lukes Roosevelt Hosp-St
Lukes
24 St Vincents Hospital and Medical
Center
25 University Hospital of Brooklyn
26 Arnot-Ogden Memorial Hospital
27 Winthrop-University Hospital
28 Erie County Medical Center
Statewide crude Mortality Rate = 4.87%
Cases
322
152
259
404
163
580
509
675
410
495
104
130
83
230
54
134
475
254
262
237
193
243
387
Crude
Mortality
Deaths Rate
11 3.42
5 3.29
10 3.86
9 2.23
7 4.29
17 2.93
23 4.52
29 4.30
15 3.66
22 4.44
9 8.65
6 4.62
3 3.61
11 4.78
4 7.41
10 7.46
29 6.11
16 6.30
14 5.34
12 5.06
11 5.70
9 3.70
18 4.65
192 19 9.90
7.64
6.77
7.33
14.29
Risk-
Adjusted
Mort. Rate
2.30
2.33
2.74
2.79
3.41
3.72
3.94
4.19
4.27
4.34
4.53
4.87
4.88
5.13
5.22
5.26
5.38
5.48
5.98
6.15
6.22
6.46
6.82
8.01
9.64
9.70
10.06
17.89
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APPENDIX TABLE 3
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
CARDIAC SURGERY REPORTING SYSTEM
RISK ADJUSTED MORTALITY RATES FOR
HOSPITALS PROVIDING CARDIAC SURGERY
IN NEW YORK STATE
CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS GRAFT PATIENTS 1990
Risk
Adjusted
Mortality
Hospital Cases Rate (%)
Albany Medical Center Hospital 630 4.52
Arnot-Ogden Memorial Hospital 536 3.10
*Bellevue Hospital Center 64 1.47
*Beth Israel Medical Center 120 1.61
Binghamton General Hospital Division 328 2.27
Buffalo General Hospital 1,072 3.76
Erie County Medical Center 95 7.97
Lenox Hill Hospital 340 2.75
*Long Island Jewish Medical Center 366 1.49
*Maimonides Medical Center 500 2.26
Millard Fillmore Hospital 463 3.56
Montefiore Medical Center - Moses Division 352 2.18
Montefiore Medical Center - Weiler Hospital 203 2.16
*Mount Sinai Hospital 501 2.00
New York Hospital 933 2.61
New York University Medical Center 694 2.75
"
5North Shore University Hospital 485 5.71
Presbyterian Hospital - City of New York 262 3.02
Rochester General Hospital 933 3.11
St Francis Hospital 1,151 2.37
St Josephs Hospital Health Center 485 2.19
St Lukes Roosevelt Hospital - St. Lukes Hosp Div 686 3.15
St Peters Hospital 411 3.63
*St Vincents Hospital and Medical Center 286 0.88
State University Hospital Upstate Med Center 254 4.43
"*Strong Memorial Hospital 303 5.85
University Hospital (Stony Brook) 230 2.43
"
5University Hospital of Brooklyn 230 5.42
Westchester County Medical Center 628 4.07
Winthrop-University Hospital 415 4.56
*Actual mortality rate significantly lower than expected
"*Actual mortality rate significantly higher than expected
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